MAY 31- JUNE 1, 1862-- Battle of Fair Oaks, or Seven Pines, Va.
No. 103. -- Report of Maj. Gen. Daniel H. Hill, C. S. Army, commanding division.

HEADQUARTERS DIVISION, 1862.

GENERAL: I have the honor to report the part taken by my division in the battle of Seven Pines, on May 31 and June 1:

Two of my brigades (that of Garland and that of Rodes) were sent out on picket duty a few days before the battle. Garland guarded the Williamsburg road, while Rodes defended the Charles City road. Both of these officers made armed reconnaissances by my order and under my personal supervision. These reconnaissances satisfied me that the enemy was not in force on the Charles City road, but was on the Williamsburg road, and that he had fortified himself about the Seven Pines. The fact was further established that the whole of Keyes’ corps had crossed the Chickahominy. These facts I communicated to General Johnston about noon on Friday, May 30. I received a prompt answer from him, saying that, being satisfied by my report of the presence of the enemy in force in my immediate front, he had resolved to attack him, and directed me to serve with Major-General Longstreet and under his orders.

I was directed by General Longstreet to move with my whole division at dawn on the Williamsburg road and to lead the attack on the Yankees. I was, however, directed not to move until relieved by Huger’s division. The relieving force not having reached me at 1 o’clock, the signal guns were fired, and my division moved off in fine style, Rodes’ brigade on the right of the road, supported by Rains’ brigade; Garland on the left, supported by G. B. Anderson. Each wing was preceded by a regiment deployed as skirmishers. Having been long delayed in waiting for the relieving force, the right wing did not advance for a quarter of an hour after the left. This exposed Garland and Anderson to the whole Yankee force. The right wing was hurried forward and came up handsomely, preserving the line, although wading through the mud and water in places 2 or 3 feet deep. I now detached General Rains, to make a wide flank movement to take the Yankee works in reverse, while Rodes moved steadily to the front. Before he (Rodes) reached the Yankee abatis Garland and Anderson had captured a 2-gnu battery, enfilading the road. A heavy column of re-enforcements was now coming up to the assistance of the Yankee general (Casey), commanding at Seven Pines. Having previously put the battery of Bondurant in position, I now brought up that of Carter, which opened just at the critical moment. The Yankee column was almost in musket-range of the gallant Col. William Smith, Forty-ninth Virginia, and his noble regiment. The Yankees came up as on a parade day, until Carter’s shot and shell began to play among them, when they broke and sought shelter in the woods. An animated artillery duel now began between Carter’s four guns and six Yankee guns. General Rains had now gained the rear of the Yankee redoubt and opened fire on the infantry posted in the woods. I now noticed commotion in the camps and redoubts, and indications of evacuating the position. Redes took skillful advantage of this commotion, and moved up his brigade in beautiful order and took possession of the redoubts and rifle pits. So rapid was the advance that six pieces were abandoned by the Yankees. These Rodes had turned upon the retreating column with effect. Carter galloped up with his pieces, and these, with the captured guns, successfully repulsed an attempt of fresh Yankee troops to recapture the works.

We had now captured eight pieces of artillery, the camp, tents, and stores of a brigade, and had successfully driven the Yankees back 1½ miles forcing them to abandon a wide skirt of abatis, rifle pits, and redoubts. My division had beaten Casey’s division and all the re-enforcements brought him, and had driven him and his supports into the woods and swamps. It was desirable, however, to press the Yankees as closely as possible. I therefore sent back to General Longstreet and asked for another brigade. In a few minutes the magnificent brigade of R. H. Anderson came to my support. A portion of this force, under Colonel Jenkins, consisting of the Palmetto Sharpshooters and the Sixth South Carolina, was sent on the extreme left to scour along the railroad and Nine-mile road, and thus get in rear of the enemy, while a portion, under General Anderson in person, was sent on the immediate left of the redoubt, into the woods, where the Yankees had hid after being repulsed by the fire of Carter’s battery and the captured guns, under the direction of General Rodes. The Yankees permitted General R. H. Anderson to get within a few yards of them, when they opened a murderous fire upon him from their cover in the woods. His heroes replied with interest, and some guns, which were brought to enfilade the Yankee lines, added to their confusion, and they were soon in full retreat. They were hotly pursued, and R. H. Anderson and Jenkins, assisted by portions of G. B. Anderson’s brigade, of my division, swept on the left of the road, driving brigade after brigade of the Yankees before them, capturing two more cannon, several camps, with their commissary and quartermaster’s stores, and finally, after dark, halting more than a mile beyond the main works of the Yankees at Seven Pines.

While this was going on Dearing’s battery had been sent up by General Longstreet, and rendered important service during the day, the officers and men behaving most heroically. I now resolved to drive the Yankees out of the woods on the right of the road, where they were still in strong force. General Rains was near them, and a written order was carried him by my adjutant to move farther to the right. I regret that that gallant and meritorious officer did not advance farther in that direction. He would have taken the Yankees in flank, and the direct attack of Rodes in front would have been less bloody. The magnificent brigade of Rodes moved over the open ground to assault the Yankees, strongly posted in the woods. He met a most galling fire, and his advance was checked. A portion of his command met with a disastrous repulse. Kemper’s brigade was now sent me by General Longstreet, and directed by me to move directly to the support of Rodes. This brigade, however, did not engage the Yankees, and Rodes’ men were badly cut up. By night-fall, nevertheless, the Yankees were driven out of the woods, and we held undisputed possession of all the ground a mile around and in advance of the redoubt, which had been the object of the struggle. The remaining brigades of General Long-street—Pickett’s, Wilcox’s, Pryor’s, and Colston’s---reported to me for orders that night. The tents and commissariat of the Yankee general (Casey) were found to be in excellent condition, and we all fared well that night. The result of the day had been most cheering. My division, weakened by one brigade, and numbering less than 9,000 men, had driven the Yankees 1½ miles and captured their stronghold; and when it had been strengthened by two more brigades the Yankees were driven a mile farther in, and prisoners were taken from three divisions. We had, therefore, fought with the odds against us of two to one in numbers, and this disparity rendered more formidable by abatis and earthworks.

At daylight next morning I learned that heavy re-enforcements had come up to the support of Keyes. Longstreet’s, Huger’s, and my own divisions had opposed to us three Yankee corps—Keyes’, Sumner’s, and Heintzelman’s. We also learned that General G. W. Smith had been checked upon the Nine-mile road, and that no help could be expected in that direction. I therefore resolved to concentrate my troops around the captured works, in the hope that the Yankees would attempt to retake them. Orders were accordingly given to the advance brigades, commanded by Pickett, Pryor, and Wilcox, to draw in their extended lines and form near the late headquarters of General Casey.

Before these orders were received a furious attack was made upon Generals Armistead, Mahone, Pickett, Pryor, and Wilcox, and their brigades on the left of the road. Armistead’s men fled early in the action, with the exception of a few heroic companies, with which that gallant officer maintained his ground against an entire brigade. Ma-hone withdrew his brigade without any orders. I sent up Colston’s to replace him, but he did not engage the Yankees, as I expected him to do. Pickett, Pryor, and Wilcox received their orders to fall back after the firing began, and wisely resolved not to do so until the assault was repulsed. As soon as that was done Wilcox and Pryor withdrew, but Pickett held his ground against the odds of ten to one for several hours longer, and only retired when the Yankees had ceased to annoy him. The Yankees were too prudent to attack us in position, and contented themselves for the balance of the day in a desultory fire of artillery, which hurt no one, and was only attended with the gratifying result of stampeding the amateur fighters and the camp plunderers from Richmond.

The batteries of Manrin, Stribling, and Watson had been added to those of the preceding day by General Longstreet, and an occasional shot was fired in response to the Yankee artillery.

The day was spent in removing 6,700 muskets and rifles in fine condition, ordnance, commissary, and medical stores. Ten captured guns had been removed the night before. As the Yankees occupied the ground in our rear, on the Nine-mile road, General Longstreet sent me an order after dark to withdraw my whole command.

The thirteen brigades were not got together until near midnight, and the delicate operation of withdrawing 30,000 men in the presence of a superior force of the enemy had to be performed before daylight. The artillery and wagons had to pass through slashes and mud-holes over their axles, and the whole road was almost impassable for infantry. Nevertheless, we regained our own intrenchments by sunrise without leaving behind a gun, caisson, wagon, or even a straggling soldier.

The officers and men of other divisions who especially distinguished themselves will be appropriately noticed by their own commanders. It will only be expected of me to call attention to gallantry and good conduct among my own men.

Generals Garland, G. B. Anderson, and Rodes, of my division, who led the attack in front, did all that brave and skillful officers could possibly do.

The flank attack of General Rains was most opportune and important. General Garland, when his brigade was not actually engaged, reported to me with his aide and adjutant to serve in my staff. In that capacity he rendered the most valuable services, and was much exposed. His adjutant, Meem, was killed, and his aide, Halsey, severely wounded near me. I had frequent occasion to notice the gallant bearing of these two officers.

All the regimental commanders acquitted themselves with great credit. Colonel Jones, of the Twelfth Alabama, left a sick bed to find bloody grave on the battle-field. He was one of the very best officers and purest men in the army.

The company, as well as the regimental officers, deserve the highest praise, and the rank and file fought with a gallantry never surpassed. It is seldom that even veteran troops will endure a greater loss than one-fourth, but those noble fellows marched steadily on after one-third of their number had been struck down. The heroism shown at Seven Pines has had a most wonderful influence upon the subsequent battles around Richmond. After this decisive victory, under such disadvantageous circumstances, not a brigade in the ranks seemed to entertain the remotest doubt of our ultimate success over the besieging army of Yankees. It is due to my gallant division to say that the great majority of the men had never before been in battle, and yet they infused a spirit into the whole army which told with powerful effect in all the subsequent engagements, ending in the total rout of McClellan. My thanks are especially due to all of my staff, who were active, brave, and efficient. Majors Ratchford, assistant adjutant-general, and Pierson, chief of artillery; Captain Tayloe, inspector-general, and Lieutenants West, aide-de-camp; Lee, engineer officer, and Moore and Fitz-hugh, volunteer aides, were in all parts of the field, and, more or less, all had personal marks of exposure. Lieutenant West had two horses killed under him and a third wounded. Several of the others had their clothes perforated by balls.

Sergeant Harmilin and his detachment of couriers were active and faithful. Courier Braden and the two Chamblins were specially distinguished. The sergeant had his horse killed under him and was himself wounded. Two of my batteries, under Hardaway and Nelson, were left behind in our intrenchments. These gallant officers would have been worthy compeers on the field of Carter and Bondurant.

Appended is a list of the killed and wounded.(*) From this it appears that of the less than 9,000 taken into action nearly 3,000 were struck down. The loss was principally in the three brigades which made the front attack. Rains’ brigade, which executed the flank movement, suffered but little in comparison.

The gallant charge of my division demoralized the Yankees, and our re-enforcements were not hotly engaged; the succor brought to Casey not fighting so well as his own men. This accounts for the fact that more than half of the entire loss in the two days’ fight fell upon my division.

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