Copyright 2000 - 2003 - Janine M. Bork
This page is part of the
Union County, OR AGHP
Operations on the Columbia River, and in the Yakima
and Walla Walla Country - Force of Troops and Volunteers at Forts Vancouver
and Steilacoom - Estimate of Number of Hostiles - Major Rains and Colonel
Nesmith Moves into the Yakima Country - Battle of the "Two Buttes - Colonel
Nesmith's Requisition on General Wool for Arms, etc., to Reinforce Major
Chinn - Lieutenant-Colonel Kelly's March to Walla Walla - Battle With the
Walla Wallas - Death of Peu-peu-mox-mox - Colonel Nesmith Resigns - Thomas
R. Cornelius Elected his Successor - The Oregon Volunteers go into Winter
Quarters at Walla Walla - Campaign in the Yakima Country - Disbanding of
the Regiment of Oregon Mounted Volunteers.
IN A REPORT dated November 17, 1855, made by Lieutenant Withers, Fourth Infantry, he numbered the force (mustered into the United States service) in Washington Territory as follows: Major Rains' command: 480 regulars (20 dragoons included); 62 volunteers, Yakima, Captain Strong, mounted, Company B, First Regiment, Washington Territory Volunteers; 50 volunteers, Yakima, Captain Newell, mounted; total, 592. Steilacoom command: 169 regulars, Fourth Infantry; 54 regulars, Third Artillery, Captain Keyes, U.S. Army; 84 volunteers, Puget Sound, Captain Hays, Mounted, Company A, First Regiment, Washington Territory Volunteers; 84 volunteers, Puget Sound, Captain Wallace, mounted, Company D, First Regiment, Washington Territory Volunteers; total, 390. Recapitulation: Regulars, 702; volunteers, 280, all mounted.
This estimate does not include the volunteer companies accepted by Governor Mason for local defense. The Indian war had become general. A combination of so formidable a character had ben made by the tribes for purposes of hostility to the Whites, that those best acquainted with the Indian character were loth to believe and could not realize it. East of the Cascade Mountains, every tribe in Washington Territory except the Flatheads, Spokanes, Pend d'Oreilles, and a portion of the Nez Perces, were in the field; and, of those tribes named, many of the young men had joined the camps of the hostiles. The lowest estimate of those engaged in the war placed the number at three thousand warriors.
Pursuant to the policy adopted by the Indian Department of collecting friendly disposed Indians on the reserves, disarming and feeding them, Lieutenant Withers ordered the band of Klikitats, living at the mouth of the Cattapootle river opposite St. Helens, to come into Vancouver and encamp under surveillance of the garrison. On the 9th of November, these Indians, evidently more frightened than with the design of hostilities, decamped and fled. Captains Strong and Newell, with a force of thirty men, were detailed to pursue and bring them in. They overtook them encamped on a prairie about thirty-five miles north of Vancouver; and, after a short parley, the Indians agreed to return.
(550)
Umtuts, their chief, starting to come in alone, was waylaid and murdered by his own party. The reason assigned for the slaying was that he had persuaded the Indians to flee from Vancouver.
As before stated, the Oregon Volunteers had been called into service upon a requisition made by the U.S. military commander of the Districts of Columbia river and Puget Sound, the condition of which was that they should be mustered into the United States service. That condition subjected those volunteers to serving under the orders of Major Rains, who had made the requisition. That intended arrangement had ben ignored by the Oregon territorial and military authorities. When the volunteers had reached Fort Dalles, Major Rains refused to accept the services of more than the four companies that he had requested by his letter to Governor Curry; and he also declined to furnish arms, ammunition or equipments, excepting to such as should be regularly mustered into the United States service. Upon being assured that such position would not be departed from by Major Rains, Colonel Nesmith addressed the following letter to Governor Curry:
"I arrived at this place on Friday night, the nineteenth inst., and the next day visited Major Rains' camp, on the opposite side of the river. The Major, with all his officers, expresses the most ardent desire to co-operate with me in the common cause of chastising the Indians, but at the same time declines to furnish any supplies, unless the troops called out by your order shall be mustered into the services of the United States. I feel, consequently, that we are thrown upon our resources, and that we must experience great embarrassment in the want of horses to mount the men, and for means of transportation.
"The embarrassment experienced in making the portage at the Cascades appears to me to be of a permanent character. If possible, this should be immediately remedied. Even the small supply of ammunition, etc., purchased by Quartermaster Thompson on the seventeenth inst., at Vancouver, which came to the Cascades with us, has not reached this point. If this delay is to be continued, that point might as well be, fr all practical purposes, in the hands of the enemy, and will prevent the command from taking the field this winter.
"I am anxiously awaiting the return here of Captain N. Olney, Sub Indian Agent, from the upper country, to obtain positive information respecting the position and intentions of the Indians in the region of Walla Walla, so as to determine on the necessity of a detour in that direction. I have suggested the propriety of such a movement to Major Haller. He appears to be of the opinion that the position and number of the enemy in the Yakima country proper will be such as to require a concentration of the entire force, volunteer and regular, in that direction. I intend to submit the plan to Major Rains to-morrow, with the view of obtaining his co-operation, if such a course should be deemed advisable, as in that event it will be highly advisable to have one or two pieces of light artillery, with United States troops to manage them, accompany the command."
Governor Curry at once communicated
with Governor Mason as follows: "Five companies of the regiment of Oregon
mounted volunteers, authorized by my proclamation on the 11th day of October,
have gone forward to the Dalles of the Columbia. The remainder will leave
the rendezvous in a few days. This regiment will be an effective force
of more than eight hundred men, as each company is much stronger in point
of numbers than is prescribed by the proclamation. To obviate delay, if
not positive failure in the enrollment of a volunteer force to meet the
present critical emergency, I have been constrained to preserve a distinct
military organization of the volunteer force from this territory. The officer
in command of the regiment will be instructed to act in concert
with the commanding officer of the United States troops in the field, as also with the officers of the forces raised under your proclamation on the 14th of October, and to co-operate with them in the prosecution of the campaign. I shall repair to the Dalles as soon as the regiment of Oregon mounted volunteers is on the march, and shall be pleased to meet and confer with you then, in the arrangement for persecuting the campaign."
Governor Curry then addressed Colonel Nesmith: "Your communication of the twenty-second has this moment reached me. Everything will be done that can be towards expediting the transportation of supplies and munitions of war. The Benton county company will leave here to-morrow for the mouth of the Sandy, and the next day the Linn county company. By the transports of Thursday morning, I shall cause the horses and equipments for Company A to be sent forward. The horses are excellent animals; and they could not be procured at an earlier day. Captain Cornelius (Company D) will be with you on Thursday, Captain Kelly (Company C) the day after. On Thursday night, I trust you will have a force of 450 men available for field operations. Still, if it bee deemed not inoperative, I should like any important movement to be deferred until my arrival; although I wish you distinctly to understand that you are clothed with ample power to act as your judgment shall dictate. Mr. McKinlay seems to believe that the combination is in the vicinity of three thousand as to numbers, and that they will fight.:
Such being the condition of affairs, on the 22d of October, James W. Nesmith, Colonel of the regiment of Oregon mounted volunteers, addressed a brief note to Major Rains, U.S. Army, commanding the Columbia river and Puget Sound Districts: "By order of the governor of Oregon, I am directed to co-operate with you in the prosecution of the campaign against the hostile Indians. I would be pleased to have a conference with you on the subject at such time and place as may best suit your convenience." Colonel Nesmith also informed Major Rains that his men only needed "adequate subsistence, camp equipage and means of transportation" to enable them to take to the field, but that the quartermaster's department had been unable to furnish them, which rendered it necessary to call on the army for them. He concluded: "No I want you to furnish subsistence and transportation to the extent I may require. If you will do so, it will enable me to penetrate the Indian country before we shall be visited by the winter season, and reduce the hostile Indians to complete acquiescence with the terms of our dictation. I am willing, and, in case you include to refuse the above-named request, I proffer, to furnish you the bond of myself and others, to the extent of the value of articles whatsoever advanced or furnished my command, conditioned for its payment to you or the United States, in case you shall be held individually responsible, or if your act in that behalf shall be disapproved or disallowed by the proper department of the government."
In reply to the above, Major Rains replied to Colonel Nesmith: "Yours of yesterday I have the honor to acknowledge; and, in conversation with the quartermaster I find that sixty horses on hand are totally unfit for our purpose, and that many of the animals though fit, on account of their having recently arrived from a trip in the prairies of more than fifteen hundred miles, are not much better. So that we are reduced to a minimum.
"Governor Curry of Oregon called
upon b me, as commanding officer of the United States troops in this district,
for volunteers; to which call he nobly and promptly responded. But he has
found it necessary to depart from the course pointed out, and kindly writes
that he could not get the force in any other way. All of us have but one
object in view, namely, to subdue the foes; and volunteers, when mustered into the service of the United States, can act anywhere and everywhere, irrespective of territorial boundaries. This also sets aside the question of right of the governor of one territory sending into another a description of force not called for by the governor of the latter, or by any United States officer. It renders my duty also plain, which obliges me, before making issues, to see that they would be properly made to a legalized number of men and officers mustered into service according to the laws of the United States. If I mistake not, a departure from these principles created the difficulty with Major-General Ed. P. Gaines at the breaking out of the Mexican War, which ultimately led to a court of inquiry at Frederick, Mo., into his conduct. I am certainly a much more humble individual; and, while acknowledging with courtesy your patriotic offer of personal security, must beg leave to decline laying myself open to a like, if not worse, procedure. Arms were furnished to a part of your command at Fort Vancouver; but this irregularity is intended to be corrected by deducting the number from the quota to which your territory is entitled by law.
"The merciless savage commenced massacring our fellow citizens. The troops of the United States rushed to the rescue. Being too few, we called for help, and calculated such call would be responded to without other views than to subdue the foe. We are too few, now, to meet the enemy, multiplied wonderfully, as we have reason to think, since the check upon the troops in the field. Whole tribes, before peaceable, are now at war; and something more should have been done ere this. I understand from you that you expected an accession to your strength to-day or to-morrow sufficient to raise the number to four hundred effective men. We have packs of provisions, mules and horses sufficient for eight hundred men for two weeks. If you and your command will be enrolled and mustered into the service of the United States, yourself as Major, a legitimate rank according to that number, and each company (one-fifth thereof) with its own elected officers, non-commissioned officers and musicians, we can take the field immediately with some show of success; but should you determine otherwise, and wait for the slow and uncertain movements of those in the rear, which, as things proceed, will not be in a condition to march before it will be winter indeed, and too late (for we have ice already about our tent doors), I shall march on with the regulars, and leave you and the citizens-in-arms with you to reconcile to themselves and their honorable feelings any mishaps which may befall us in fulfilling our duty to our country."
Colonel Nesmith answered: "Your
communication of yesterday, in reply to mine of the twenty-third inst.,
is before me. I regret exceedingly that you should find yourself compelled
to decline to furnish the supplies and transportation so necessary for
my command to take the field in a prompt and efficient manner. As to the
matter of being mustered into the United States service, while I have myself
no objection, it is a matter entirely beyond my control. Governor Curry
is expected here on Saturday. On his arrival, this question may be adjusted
to the satisfaction of all parties. I have information which induces me
to believe that four hundred mounted men of my command will be concentrated
at this point within the next three days. I design crossing them as rapidly
as possible after their arrival, and shall for a camp at the nearest point
convenient for that purpose, where grass can be obtained, on the Washington
side of the river, and shall then take up the line of march for the enemy's
country with such facilities as are at my command. I most earnestly wish
for cordial co-operation in our common object."
Major Rains marched into the Yakima country, from his camp opposite The Dalles, on the 30th of October, with 350 regulars, and twenty days' provisions. Six companies of Oregon volunteers, all mounted, commanded by Colonel Nesmith, followed on the first of November with Companies C, D, E, F and G. A few days later, Companies A and K were joined to his command, augmenting his force to 553 men, rank and file.
The operations of the forces operating in the Yakima country under Major Rains, U.S. Army, and Colonel Nesmith, of the Oregon volunteers, are thus detailed by the former in a dispatch to Governor Mason, from the Roman Catholic Mission of the Yakima, dated November 12, 1855:
"Here we are without a battle, except a skirmish four days since with some forty Indians, who defied us as we approached the Yakima river. We thought that it was the prelude to the big battle with the whole of their force, and forded the stream to an island with our mounted troops, eighteen dragoons and eight pioneers. Here we commenced the action, firing on the enemy, and ordered up our artillery and infantry to ford the stream. Our troops made rush into the water, but, being on foot, tried again and again to cross the river but failed, the rapid current sweeping away to of our best men, who were thus drowned; whereupon I sent back to Colonel Nesmith for two companies of volunteers, who, with our dragoons, drove headlong into the foaming torrent, and reaching the opposite shore charged the enemy, who fled away over the hills, one of their balls striking, but fortunately not wounding, Colonel Nesmith's horse.
"Late in the afternoon, after recalling all our forces to the south bank of the Yakima river, we heard, some distance on the plain, the reports of small arms (indication of a fight), and, taking two companies, we proceeded in that direction until some time after night, when, the firing having ceased, we returned to the edge of the timber and bivouacked for the night. Next day we found a number of Indians around us on swift horses, who were driven off by our mounted volunteer companies. As we approached the mountain gore, we found the Indians, about three hundred in number, on the hill tops beating their drums and shouting defiance. These were soon driven from their position and scattered by discharges from our howitzers. We cut off some of them by a proper disposition of our troops; and two or more were killed. We continued our march to this place, sweeping the plains with our cavalry, dispersing, killing and wounding all the enemy we saw, and found the mission abandoned. Captain Maloney not having arrived in conjunction and Colonel Nesmith (who himself went in command), we dispatched one hundred and sixty-eight volunteers and regulars, on our best horses, to proceed in the direction of the Nahchess pass, and ascertain his whereabouts. We are awaiting their report; for we cannot tell where the large body of the enemy is, unless they have gone that way to attack Captain Maloney's command."
In the Portland Democratic Standard was a very interesting and detailed account of field operations in the Indian country, up to December 1, 1855. It exhibited also the good feeling between the officers of the army and volunteers prosecuting that Yakima campaign:
"In the engagement at the Yakima
river (mentioned in Major Rains' dispatch), Captain Bennett's company (Company
F) and part of the Clackamas company (Company C), took part and were the
first to cross the river and charge the enemy, who fled with great rapidity,
so much so that the disabled state of the horses of the volunteers rendered
pursuit unsuccessful. Captain Cornelius' company (Company D) having
become separated from the main body of the volunteers on the day of the
engagement at the river,
encountered a superior force of Indians and fought them nearly a half day. He kept them at bay and succeeded in taking some cattle and driving them into camp that night. Two of his men were severely wounded. The damage inflicted upon the Indians was not known. In the attack the next day at the mountain gorge spoken of by Major Rains, otherwise called the "Two Buttes," the number of Indians was not less than five hundred. About one hundred and fifty were counted upon the top of the hill; and the remainder were in the brush. By some misunderstanding of the orders given to surround them, a gap was left open; and those made their escape. Two only were killed. Pursuit was of no avail.
"The regulars and volunteers encamped near the mission, which, having been abandoned, it was conjectured that the main force of the Indians had either gone to the Nahchess Pass to attack Captain Maloney, or up the Columbia to Priest's rapids. Colonel Nesmith, was a command of two hundred and fifty men, proceeded towards the pads, and after an absence of three days returned without having seen the enemy. He found the snow so deep as to prevent the forage of his animals, and was compelled to return. He found caches of Indian provisions, which he destroyed, and several Indian mares and colts, which were killed, as they could be of no service to the volunteers. Some wild Indian cattle were also found and killed, which furnished subsistence for the troops. In and about the mission were found vegetables and a variety of useful articles.
"On Colonel Nesmith's return, a council of officers was held, by which it was deemed inexpedient to proceed to Walla Walla, owing to the scarcity of forage, the weak condition of the animals, and the difficulty of crossing the Columbia with the sick and wounded. It was decided to return to The Dalles and recruit. After burning the mission and a house owned by Kamiakin, the whole force, regulars and volunteers, took up their line of march for The Dalles. On their way, they met Captain Wilson's command (Company A) with the pack train of supplies, which train had suffered great loss of animals and supplies by reason of the snows in the mountains, which in some places were four or five feet in depth. The expedition reached the Klikitat river, about twenty-five miles distant from The Dalles, on the seventeenth, and there encamped. The most cordial co-operation had existed between the regular and volunteer officers. All seemed animated with a common interest in accomplishing the ends and objects of the campaign."
Colonel Nesmith himself had reached
The Dalles on the eighteenth, and there found an express from Major Chinn
to Lieutenant-Colonel Kelly, asking for reinforcements. It must be remembered
that on the 12th of November, while Colonel Nesmith with several companies
of Oregon volunteers was prosecuting operations in the Yakima valley, Major
Chinn, with Company B, Captain Humason, had been dispatched to the mouth
of the Des Chutes, where Company H, Captain Taylor, was encamped. The two
companies marched to Well's Springs, were they arrived on the seventeenth.
At that point, Major Chinn learned by an express from Narcisse Raymond
that the Walla Wallas, led by Peu-peu-mox-mox, had become hostile; that,
after robbing Fort Walla Walla and possessing themselves of the ammunition
which was stored there, they had dismantled it. This determined him to
delay his march into the Walla Walla country until he had received reinforcement
and artillery. On the next day, he marched to the Umatilla river, where
he erected a fortification which he described: "We have an abundance of
water and timber, and enough grass for stock. We have picketed in with
large split timber one hundred feet square of ground, and erected two bastions
of round logs on two of the angles, and made two corrals for the horses
and cattle. This as a defense is
good against any body of Indians." The station so established was called Fort Henrietta. On the twenty-first, Major Chinn applied to Colonel Nesmith for two more companies. Colonel Nesmith responded, sending three companies, viz.: Company A, captain Wilson, Company I, Captain Munson, and Company K, Captain Cornoyer, numbering 170 men.
On the 17th of November, General Wool, commanding the Department of the Pacific, had arrived at Vancouver. About the same period, Major Rains and his command had returned to The Dalles, and had gone into winter quarters. Colonel Nesmith's command reached The Dalles on the 19th of November.
The arrival of General Wool defeated every project which looked to a winter campaign against the Indians, or to any co-operation between the regulars and volunteers. He even suggested that the combination of the two commands of Rains and Nesmith, in the Yakima country, had been injurious to the service, because the Indians were so overawed by such a force, seven hundred men, that they fled upon the approach of the troops. General Wool ordered the regulars from Fort Dalles to Fort Vancouver, except a small garrison. He censured Major Rains for calling for volunteers, and also for going into the Yakima country to make war against the hostiles. He accused the territorial authorities of sinister and dishonest motives. While not accusing the Whites in Washington Territory of murdering Indians, as he did charge the Whites within the Rogue river country, yet he maintained that war should only be carried on upon the defensive. To any proposition of the territorial authorities to chastise the Indians for their past misdeeds, he was opposed, and should use his efforts to defeat. In fact, he was so bitterly prejudiced against the two territories, their official authorities, their volunteers and their people, that his sympathies were entirely with that savage race which it was his highest duty to keep in subjection. For the people who had the right to rely upon him for protection, he had no word of encouragement, no disposition to assist. At that tie he was a greater marplot to the regaining of peace, and a more bitter foe to the Oregon and Washington people, than any hostile chief bearing arms against them.
Colonel Nesmith, who had reinforced Major Chinn by sending to his aid the troops required, desiring also to furnish the necessary artillery to enable him to move forward to Fort Walla Walla, and if necessary to dislodge the hostile Walla Wallas from the fort, thus addressed General Wool:
"On my return to this place from
the Yakima country, on the evening of the nineteenth inst., I received
an express from Second Major Chinn, who had been ordered by the governor
of Oregon territory to advance in the direction of Walla Walla, that his
front was menaced by a force of one thousand Indians, led on by the notorious
Peu-peu-mox-mox; that, as his command consisted of only about one hundred
and forty men, he had called a halt on the Umatilla river, and desired
to be immediately reinforced. I have this morning sent forward to his relief
a force of seventy men, and shall send one hundred more to-morrow. It is
represented that Peu-peu-mox-mox, with his one thousand warriors, has taken
a strong position. To dislodge him, it is desirable to have the service
of the artillery. I have therefore to request that you will furnish me
with two or three howitzers, or other equivalent artillery, with officers
and men requisite to manage the same, for that purpose. I can furnish a
mounted escort to forward the artillery to the command on the Umatilla,
provided you, in the plenitude of your power, see proper to grant my request.
If, in the exercise of your superior judgment, you could conclude to comply
with my request, I would suggest it is very desirable the movement should
be executed with all possible dispatch.. I hope we may shortly have the
pleasure of seeing you at this place."
Receiving no answer to this, Colonel Nesmith addressed Major Rains: "On my arrival here, the evening of the eighteenth inst., I received an express from the second major of my regiment, who was then advancing towards the Walla Walla country with a volunteer force of about one hundred and fifty men. The express brought me intelligence that the command of the Major was threatened by an overwhelming force of the enemy; and I was requested to reinforce him with one hundred and fifty men and two howitzers. I have sent forward the number of men asked for; and, in your absence from Fort Dalles, I forwarded to Major-General Wool a request to be furnished with the artillery, and a requisite number of officers and men to work the same properly.
"The delay incident to communication between this place and Vancouver renders it quite uncertain as to the time I may receive the reply of the General. In view of this, I made this morning the verbal application to you, as the commanding officer of this military district, to furnish me with the howitzers, hoping that under the present emergency you would feel yourself warranted promptly to respond to my call. 'The merciless savages' having driven our people from the valley of the Walla Walla, burned their dwellings and captured their stock, 'the troops of' Oregon Territory have 'rushed to the rescue.' Not having in our possession the necessary appliances of war,' we called for help, and calculated such call would be responded to without other views than to subdue the foe.' Without artillery, 'we are too few to meet the enemy, multiplied wonderfully, as we have reason to think, since the check upon the troops in the field. Whole tribes, before peaceable, are now at war; and something more should have been done 'in the way of furnishing artillery 'ere this.'
"If the howitzers, with the officers and men to manage them, are furnished, I can readily provided a mounted escort to take them before the position occupied by the enemy, and 'can take the field immediately with some show of success; but should you determine otherwise, and wait for the slow and uncertain movements of those in the rear, which, as things proceed, will not be in condition to march before it will be winter indeed, and too late, 'for we have had ice and snow already, without 'tents' to afford us any protection, 'I shall march on with the 'volunteers, 'and leave you to reconcile to your honorable feelings any mishaps which may befall us in fulfilling our duty to our country.'"
To which Major Rains replied: "Your letter of yesterday for artillery, I have had the honor to acknowledge, and also its facetiousness in the lengthy quotation of a former letter of mine seemingly applicable to our present position: When the letter was written, there was scarcely a doubt that we had a big fight before us; but now we know otherwise, and have had assurances that an adequate force would find no enemy to combat, and an inadequate one would likely be defeated. So it becomes questionable, if your command went to Walla Walla, with canon and 'the requisite number of officers and men to work the same properly,' if the enemy would wait in the mud walls of that fort to receive you.
"Our difficulties lie now not at any unwillingness to meet the enemy, as you know, but in our inability to find him; and while acknowledging your courteousness on former occasions, where your chivalry was displayed to advantage in gallant charges with your mounted troops upon the foe, we would fain accommodate you with the artillery required, but are now entirely under the instructions of Major-General Wool, commanding the Department of the Pacific, with whose plans such overt action on my part might conflict, and from whom you will probably hear to-morrow.
"P.S. - In an emergency, of course
our utmost endeavors would be to relieve you."
Subsequently to receipt of this, Colonel Nesmith received the following reply from General Wool: "I have but just this moment received your communication of the twenty-first inst., by Major Haller. In reply I have only to say that I have no authority either to employ or to receive volunteers into the service of the United States. I am, therefore, unable to comply with your request. I will, however, observe that, owing to the condition of the United States troops, animals and other requisite supplies necessary to carry on an efficient campaign, or even temporary operations against the Indians, I have ordered a critical examination of the United States troops and supplies of every description, embracing wagons, horses and mules, all of which is with reference to an efficient preparation for future operations. Hitherto, the expeditions against the Indians have been made in too much of a hurry, unable to act efficiently, and without supplies to keep the field. Unless prepared to take the field, it would be more than folly to attempt to encounter the Indians with any expectation of success. In conclusion, I suggest that I have not power to give you the assistance you ask for."
This was the first of a series of acts on the part of that officer to deny protection to the people of Oregon and Washington. Without a shadow of a cause or right to provoke it, he had become a malignant, unrelenting slanderer, and never ceased his persecutions of any and all who were connected with said territories, or who had sympathy for them in that dark hour of peril. Had he devoted tot he chastisement of the Indians one tithe the amount of energy or industry that he displayed in slandering the people and the authorities of the two territories, his previously well-earned laurels in long service for his country might have spared him the tarnish of his reputation, by the total failure of his campaign of the winter of 1855-56, to which he had invoked the attention of the world by the grandiloquent assertion that "his headquarters would be in the saddle." As a scold he acquired notoriety. As a solder he gained no reputation.
That petty act of meanness illustrates the animus of the commanding general of the department, whose ignorance of the country and gross negligence in the distribution of troops had contributed so greatly to encourage the Indians to believe that they could banish the Whites form the region. Later he pretended that he acted upon the information of General Palmer, the superintendent of Indian affairs of Oregon, who expressed himself about that date. "I am unwilling to believe that the Walla Wallas will engage in hostilities against us, unless provoked by overt acts of our own citizens. I am satisfied that the Cayuses as a tribe are desirous of maintaining peace. This is true also of the Nez Perces. Their uniform good conduct and friendship for our citizens renders it improbable that they intend to make war. The reported combination of all these tribes to wage a war of extermination against the Whites is, I apprehend, but a phantom conjured up in the brains of alarmists."
At this time, the volunteers
were badly off, scantily clothed, poorly armed, and their animals broken
down by the service in the Yakima country. On the 26th of November, Colonel
Nesmith addressed the Governor from The Dalles: "I have assumed the responsibility
of discharging about one hundred and twenty-five men from my regiment.
Several of this number have been discharged upon the report of the assistant
surgeon of the regiment that they were unfit for service. The greater portion
discharged are from the companies commanded by Captains Cornelius, Hembree
and Bennett (those companies have been ordered to this side of the Columbia
to hold themselves in readiness to proceed to Walla Walla), from the fact
of being mounted on horses totally unfit to make the trip. As there are
no horses here suitable to remount the men, I resolved to
grant their applications to be discharged, deeming it worse than useless to retain a large unmounted force at this place to consume our scanty supplies, all of which are unconditionally required for those who are in condition to remain in the service. I would respectively and earnestly invite your immediate and close attention to the fact that the commissary department here is almost destitute of every indispensable article of subsistence, and particularly flour and fresh beef. It is deeply to be regretted that, of the large number of horses now in the hands of the quartermaster at this post, scarcely one is fit for service. Whatever may have been their condition when purchased, they are entirely useless, and are daily becoming worse than useless, owing to the scarcity of grass and the almost entire want of forage in the quartermaster's department.
"This deficiency is keenly felt at the present time, by reason of the necessity for remounting the men in order to render them of the least efficiency against an enemy well supplied with fleet horses. It is with great difficulty that suitable animals can be had to answer the immediate demands for transportation. These difficulties will become nearly insurmountable when it becomes necessary to transport supplies for a large force over the distance from here to Walla Walla. The severity of the weather has been such that the men have experienced severe suffering from the want of tents. It is the cause of daily complaint by the men, that they are not provided with tents. This should be remedied at the earliest possible period of time."
To return to Major Chinn and his little command at Fort Henrietta. On the 29th of November, Major chinn had been joined by reinforcements forwarded by Colonel Nesmith. Lieutenant-Colonel Kelly had accompanied to take command of operations in the Walla Walla country. After sunset, December 2d, Lieutenant-Colonel Kelly left Fort Henrietta, leaving that post in charge of Lieutenant Sword, Company I, with a detachment of twenty-five men, his force consisting of Companies A, Captain Wilson, B, Captain Humason, F, Captain Charles Bennett, H, Captain Layton, I, Captain Munson, and K, Captain Cornoyer, numbering about three hundred and fifty men. It was Colonel Kelly's design to reach Fort Walla Walla early in the morning and surprise the Indians. The fort, however, had been abandoned by the Indians, after all the furniture had been destroyed. The volunteers continued there for two days, at which time Major Chinn, with one hundred and fifty men and the baggage, set out for the mouth of the Touchet. Colonel Kelly, with two hundred men, without baggage or provisions, marched up the Touchet to find the Walla Wallas, whom the scouts had reported as camped upon its banks.
Colonel Kelly thus officially reported the operations of his command: "On the evening of the eighth inst., I gave you a hasty report of our battle with Indians up to the close of the second day's fight, and then stated that at a future time I would give a more detailed account of all transactions that occurred since the march from the Umatilla river. Owing to active engagements in the field, and in pursuit of the Indians, I have not hitherto had leisure to make that report.
"As soon as it was dark on the
evening of the second, I proceeded with my command from Fort Henrietta
to Walla Walla, having left a detachment of twenty-five men, under command
of Lieutenant Sword, to protect the former post. On the morning of the
third, we encamped on the bank of the Walla Walla river about four miles
from the fort; and, proceeding to the latter place, I found it had been
pillaged by the Indians, the buildings much defaced and the furniture destroyed.
"On the morning of the fifth, a body of Indians was observed on the opposite side of the Columbia, apparently making preparations to cross the river with a large amount of baggage. Seeing us in possession of the fort, they were deterred from making the attempt, when I sent a small detachment down to a bar making into the Columbia immediately below the mouth of the Walla Walla, and opposite to where the Indians were, with directions to fire upon them and prevent the removal of their packs of provisions. The width of the river at this place is about two hundred and fifty yards; and a brisk fire was at once opened upon the Indians, which wa returned by them from behind the rocks on the opposite shore. No boats could be procured to cross the river in order to secure the provisions or to attack the body of Indians, numbering about fifty, who made their appearance on the hill north of Walla Walla, who, after surveying our encampment started off in a northeasterly direction. I at once determined to follow in pursuit of them on the following day.
"Early on the morning of the fifth, I dispatched Second Major Chinn, with one hundred and fifty men, to escort the baggage and pack-trains to the mouth of the Touchet, there to await my return with the remainder of the forces under my command. On the same morning I marched with about two hundred men to a point on the Touchet river about twelve miles from its mouth, with the view of attacking the Walla Walla Indians, who were supposed to be encamped there. When I was near to and making towards the village, Peu-peu-mox-mox, the chief of the tribe, with six other Indians, made their appearance under a flag of truce. He stated that he did not wish to fight; that his people did not wish to fight; and that on the following day he would come and have a talk and make a treaty of peace. On consultation with Hon. Nathan Olney, Indian Agent, we concluded that this was simply a ruse to gain time for removing his village and preparing for battle. I stated to him that we had come to chastise him for the wrongs he had done to our people, and that we would not defer making an attack on his people unless he and his five followers would consent to accompany and remain with us until all difficulties were settled. I told him that he might go away under his flag of truce if he chose; but, if he did so, we would forthwith attack his village. The alternative was distinctly made known to him; and, to save his people, he chose to remain with us as a hostage for the fulfillment of his promise, as did also those who accompanied him. He at the same time said that on the following day he would accompany us to his village; that he would then assemble his people and make them deliver up all their arms and ammunition, restore the property which had been taken from the white settlers, or pay the full value of that which could not be restored; and that he would furnish fresh horses to remount my command, and cattle to supply them with provisions, to enable us to wage war against other hostile tribes who were leagued with him. Having made these promises, we refrained form making the attack, thinking we had him in our power, and that on the next day his promises would be fulfilled. I also permitted him to send one of the men who accompanied him to his village to apprise the tribes of the terms of the expected treaty, so that they might be prepared to fulfill it.
"On the sixth, we marched to
the village and found it entirely deserted, but saw the Indians in considerable
force on the distant hills, and watching our movements. I sent out a messenger
to induce them to come in, but could not do so. And I will here observe
that I have since learned, from a Nez Perce boy who was taken at the same
time with Peu-peu-mox-mox, that, instead of sending word to his people
to make a treaty of peace, he sent an order for them to remove their women
and children and prepare for battle.
From all I have since learned, I am well persuaded that he was acting with duplicity, and that he expected to entrap my command in the deep ravine in which his camp was situated, and make his escape from us. We remained at the deserted village until about one o'clock in the afternoon; and, seeing no hope of coming to any terms, we proceeded to the mouth of the Touchet with a view of going from thence to some spot near Whitman's station, where I had intended to form a permanent camp for the winter.
"On the morning of the seventh, Companies H and K crossed the Touchet, leading the column on the route to Whitman's valley, and, when formed on the plain, were joined by Company B. A few persons in front were driving our cattle; and a few were on the flanks of the companies and near the foot of the hills that extended along the river. These persons, as well as I can ascertain, were fired on by the Indians. Immediately all the companies except A and F (who were ordered to remain with the baggage) commenced an eager chase of the Indians in sight. A running fight was the consequence, the force of the Indians increasing every mile. Several of the enemy were killed in the chase before reaching the farm of La Rocque, which is about twelve miles from the mouth of the Touchet. At this point they made a stand, their left resting on the river covered with trees and underbrush, their center occupying the flat at this place covered with clumps of sagebrush and small sand knolls, their right on the high ridge of hills which skirt the river bottom.
"When the volunteers reached this point, they were not more than forty or fifty men, being those mounted on the fleetest horses. Upon these the Indians poured a murderous fire from the brushwood and willows along the river, and from the sage bushes along the plain, wounding a number of the volunteers. The men fell back. The moment was critical. They were commanded to cross the fence which surrounds La Rocque's field, and charge upon the Indians in the brush. In executing this order, Lieutenant Burrows of Company H was killed; and Captain Munson of Company I, Isaac Miller, Sergeant-Major, and G.W. Smith of Company B, were wounded. A dispatch having been sent to Captain Wilson of Company A to come forward, eh and his company came up on the gallop, dismounted at a slough, and with fixed bayonets pushed on through the brush. In the course of half an hour, Captain Bennett was on the ground with Company F, and, with this accession, the enemy were steadily driven forward for two miles, when they took possession of a farm house and close fence, in attempting to carry which Captain Bennett of Company F, and private Kelso of Company A, were killed.
"A howitzer found at Fort Walla Walla, under charge of Captain Wilson, by this time was brought to bear upon the enemy. Four rounds were fired, when the piece bursted, wounding Captain Wilson. The Indians then gave way at all points; and the house and fence were seized and held by the volunteers and the bodies of our men recovered. these positions were held by us until nightfall, when the volunteers feel slowly back and returned unmolested to camp.
"Early on the morning of the
8th, the Indians appeared with increased forces, amounting to fully six
hundred warriors. They were posted as usual in the thick brush by the river,
among the sage bushes and sand knolls, and on the surrounding hills. This
day Lieutenant Pillow with Company A, and Lieutenant Hannah with Company
H, were ordered to take and hold the brush skirting the river and the sage
bushes on the plain. Lieutenant Fellows, with Company F, was directed to
take and keep the possession of the point at the foot on the hill. Lieutenant
Jeffries with Company B, Lieutenant Hand with Company I, and Captain Cornoyer
with Company K, were posted on three several points
on the hills, with orders to maintain them and to assail the enemy on other points of the same hills. As usual, the Indians were driven from their position, although they fought with skill and bravery.
"On the ninth, they did not make their appearance until about ten o'clock in the morning, and then in somewhat diminished numbers. As I had sent to Fort Henrietta for Companies D and E, and expected them on the tenth, I though it best to act on the defensive and hold our positions, which were the same as on the eighth, until we could get an accession to our forces sufficient to enable us to assail their rear and cut off their retreat. An attack was made during the day on Companies A and H in the brushwood, and upon B on the hill, both of which were repulsed with great gallantry by those companies, and with considerable loss to the enemy. Companies F, I and K also did honor to themselves in repelling all approaches to their positions, although in doing so one many in Company F, and one in company I, were severely wounded. Darkness as usual closed the combat, by the enemy withdrawing from the field. Owing to the inclemency of the night, the companies on the hill were withdrawn from their several positions, Company B abandoning the rifle pits which were made by the men for its protection. At early dawn on the next day, the Indians were observed from our camp to be in possession of all points held by us on the preceding day. Upon seeing them, Lieutenant McAuliffe of Company B gallantly observed that his company had dug those holes, and that after breakfast they would have them again. And well was his declaration fulfilled; for in less than half an hour the enemy were driven from the rifle pits, and had fled to an adjoining hill which they had occupied the day before. This position was at once assailed. Captain Cornoyer with Company K, and a portion of company I, being mounted, gallantly charged the enemy on his right flank; while Lieutenant McAuliffe with Company B, dismounted, rushed up the hill in face of a heavy fire, and scattered them in all directions. They at once fled in all directions to return to this battle field no more; and thus ended our long-contested fight.
"I have already given you a list
of the killed and wounded on the first two days of the battle. On the last
two days, we had only three wounded, whose names you will find subjoined
to this report. J. Fleming, of Company A, before reported as mortally wounded,
has since died. I am happy to state, however, that private Jasper
Snook, of Company H, reported by me as mortally wounded, is in a fair way
to recover. The surgeon informs me that all the wounded in the hospital
are now doing well. The loss of the enemy in killed, during the four days,
I estimate at about seventy-five. Thirty-nine dead bodies have already
been found by the volunteers; and many were carried off the field by their
friends and comrades. So that I think that my estimate is about correct.
The number of their wounded must of course be great. In making my report,
cannot say too much in the praise of the conduct of the officers of the
several companies and most of the soldiers under my command. They did their
duty bravely and well during those four trying days of battle. To Second
Major Chinn, who took charge of the companies in the bush by the river,
credit is due for his bravery and skill, also to Assistant Adjutant Monroe
Atkinson for his efficiency and zeal as well in the field as in the camp.
And here, while giving ot the officers and men of the regiment the praise
that is justly due, I cannot omit the name of Hon. Nathan Olney, although
he is not one of the volunteers. Having accompanied me in the capacity
of Indian agent, I requested him to act as my aid, on account of his admitted
skill in Indian warfare; and, to his wisdom in council and daring courage
on the field of battle, I am much indebted, and shall never case to appreciate
his worth.
"Companies D and E having arrived from Fort Henrietta on the evening of the tenth, the next morning I followed with all the available troops along the Nez Perces' trail in pursuit of the Indians. On Mill creek, about twelve miles from here, we passed through their village numbering 196 fires, which had been deserted the night before. Much of their provisions were scattered along the wayside, indicating that they had fled in great haste to the north. We pursued them until it was too dark to follow the track of their horses, when we camped on Coppei creek. On the twelfth, we continued the pursuit until we passed some distance beyond the station of Brooke, Noble and Bumford on the Touchet, when we found the chase was in vain, as many of our horses were completely broken down and the men on foot. We therefore returned, and arrived in camp on yesterday evening with about one hundred head of cattle which the Indians left scattered along the trail in their flight."
"On the eleventh, while in pursuit of the enemy, I received a letter from Narcisse Raymond by the hands of Tin-tin-metzy, a friendly chief (which I inclose), asking our protection of the French and friendly Indians under his charge.
"On the morning of the twelfth, I dispatched Captain Cornoyer with his company to their relief. Mr. Olney, who accompanied them, returned to camp this evening, and reports that Captain Cornoyer will return to-morrow with Mr. Raymond and his people, who now feel greatly relieved form their critical situation. Mr. Olney learned from these friendly Indians what we before strongly believed, that the Palouses, Walla Wallas, Umatillas, Cayuses, and Stock Whitley's band of Des Chutes Indians, were all engaged in the battle on the Walla Walla. These Indians also informed Mr. Olney that, after the battle, the Palouses, Walla Wallas and Umatillas had gone partly to the Grande Ronde and partly to the country of the Nez Perces, and that Stock Whitley, disgusted with the manner in which the Cayuses fought in the battle, has abandoned them and gone to the Yakima country to join his forces with those of Kamiakin. We have now the undisputed possession of the country south of the Snake river; and I would suggest the propriety of retaining this possession until such time as it can be occupied by the regular troops. The Indians have left much of their stock behind, which will doubtless be lost to us if we go away. The troops here will not be in a situation for some time to go to the Palouse country, as our horses at present are too much jaded to endure the journey; and we have no boats to cross the Snake river, and no timber to make them nearer than this place. But I would suggest the propriety of following up the Indians with all possible speed, now that their hopes are blighted and their spirits were broken. Unless this can be done, they will perhaps rally again.
"To-day I received a letter from Governor Stevens, dated yesterday, which I inclose. You will perceive that he is in favor of a vigorous prosecution of the war. With his views I fully concur.
"I must earnestly ask that supplies
be sent forward to us without delay. For the last three days, none of the
volunteers, except the two companies from Fort Henrietta, have had any
flour. None is here, and but little at that post. we are now living on
beef and potatoes which are found en cache; and the men are becoming
much discontented with this mode of living. Clothing for the men is much
needed as winter approaches. To-morrow we will remove to a more suitable
point, where grass can be obtained in greater abundance for our worn-out
horses. A place has been selected about two miles above Whitman's station,
on the same (north) side of the Walla Walla; consequently I will
abandon this fort, named in honor of Captain Bennett of Company F, who now sleeps beneath its stockade, and whose career of usefulness and bravery was here so sadly but nobly closed.
"Very respectfully, your ob't serv't,
"JAMES K. KELLY,
Lieut.-Col., Com'g Left Col."
The loss of Oregon troops in the battle of Walla Walla was as follows: Killed, Captain Charles Bennett, Company F, Second Lieutenant J.M. Burrows, Company H, Privates Simon S. Hagerman, Company I, Kelso, Company A, Henry Crow, Company H, Joseph Strutevant, Company B, Jesse Fleming, Company A; Dangerously wounded, Captain Layton, Company H, Privates Jasper Snook, Company H, T.J. Payne, Company H, F. Crabtree, Company H, J.B. Gervais, Company H, Nathan Fry, Company H; Severely wounded, Captain A.V. Wilson, Company A, Captain Munson, Company I, Sergeant-Major Isaac Miller, Company H, Private G.W. Smith, Company B; Slightly wounded, Privates Franklin Duval, Company A, A.H. Addington, Company H.
Among the killed of the seventh was the celebrated chief of the Walla Wallas, Peu-peu-mox-mox or the "Yellow Serpent." Of the circumstances of his death, Colonel Kelly in his dispatch to Adjutant Farrar, dated December 8, 1855, said: "Among those killed yesterday was the noted chief of the Walla Wallas, the celebrated Peu-peu-mox-mox. He was taken prisoner by my command on the fifth instant, near his camp on the Touchet, and during the battle yesterday made an effort to escape. In doing so he was killed, together with four others who were made prisoners at the same time, and who also attempted to get away."
The killing of Peu-peu-mox-mox was not only of importance because of his prominent position among the Indians of the confederated tribes hostile to the Whites, and his great wealth and influence with those tribes, but because it has been the great subject of comment by those who, following the example of Major-General Wool, have sought some shadow of justification for their unceasing denunciation of the people of Oregon and Washington, their denial of common sympathy, their repudiation of the just and well-founded claims of indemnity and protection from the national government. From one end of the federal Union to the other, the slaying of Peu-peu-mox-mox has been denounced as a treacherous and cold-blooded murder.
It is true there was great rejoicing among Oregonians and Washingtonians at the death of that perfidious and mischief-making Indian. But was there no occasion for it? It is true that volunteers thought they had done inestimable service, when the scourge in that section of country was powerless for further evil. It is too true that it was in ill taste for the soldiery of a civilized race to collect as trophies portions of the scalp and ears of the deceased chieftain. But much may be said in extenuation. Indian Agent Nathan Olney, in reporting to Superintendent Palmer this occurrence, states as follows:
"We arrived near the camp (Walla
Wallas) just before night (the fifth of December), and were met by Peu-peu-mox-mox
and about fifty of his men with a white flag. They asked for a talk. We
halted (Colonel Kelly's command) and demanded what he wanted. He said peace.
We told him to come with us and we would talk. He said no. We then told
him to take back his flag and we would fight. He said no. We then told
him to take his choice, - go back and fight, or come and stop with us.
He chose the latter. We retained him until the next day. We tried to come
to an understanding, but could not.
We still retained him as a prisoner, with four of his men who came along with him. The next morning, the seventh, a large force attacked us as we left camp. In trying to escape from their guard during the seventh, they were killed."
From all that can be gathered from the witnesses of his death, whilst we may without stint reprobate the indignities to his person as unbecoming the spirit of the age, yet his killing was demanded by every principle justified in war (1). For months he had been endeavoring to alienate the Indians from their friendship for the Whites. Less than a month before he had seized and sacked Fort Walla Walla. His threats of intention to cut off the party of Governor Stevens, as the latter should return from the Blackfoot council, were oft repeated. The testimony of Agent Olney gives the falsehood to the charge that he was entrapped by a flag of truce. He came in voluntarily. He had his choice of peace or war. He consented to remain with the force of Colonel Kelly, as a pledge of his adherence to the former. While the battle was raging, he rose upon his guard and sought to slay them, violating his parole of peace; and, having learned the strength of the Whites, he attempted to escape and join his people. His killing under the circumstances was a legitimate consequence of the war. Self-protection, self-defense and military judgment alike demanded it. And nothing is hazarded in saying, that had the chieftain been the hostage of General Wool, and had made the attempt to escape during an engagement, his life would as promptly have been forfeited.
The battle was fought on the line of the two territories. Most of the Indians engaged belonged to the territory of Oregon. But the inseparable relations of the tribes east of the Cascades, on both sides of the Columbia river, made those tribes the common enemy of Oregon and Washington; and the morale of this defeat was vastly beneficial.
After the battle of Walla Walla, the volunteers went into winter quarters in the country of the indians whom they had so signally defeated, protecting the few straggling settlers of the upper country, overawing the hostile Indians and preventing acts of reprisal upon friendly bands, and keeping the communication open with The Dalles. Their camp was changed occasionally to secure feed for the horses. It was a severe and dreary winter to those patriotic men, who willingly gave up the comforts of home and a milder climate, accompanied with the comforts of life. They were exposed to a winter temperature of twenty degrees below zero, and were denied all its necessaries. Without sufficiency of blankets, clothing and food, they patiently waited till spring should open, and active operations in the field be resumed. On the 21st of December, Thomas R. Cornelius, Captain of Company D, had been elected colonel of the regiment, in place of Colonel James W. Nesmith, resigned. Narcisse E. Cornoyer, Captain of the company of scouts, (K), succeeded Major Mark A. Chinn, Antoine River succeeding to the command of Company K. During the winter, a battalion of recruits had been formed in Willamette valley, from which Colonel Cornelius' command was strengthened early in March, they taking the places of volunteers discharged, whose terms of enlistment had expired.
With the earliest opening of spring, Colonel Cornelius determined upon an active campaign in the Yakima country. The orders of Governor Curry, with the official report of Colonel Cornelius, give the keynote and motive of that campaign. They make the record of the men who participated in that memorable winter campaign, which will in history be ranked as the parallel of the "Valley Forge' of the "times that tried men's souls," more to be remembered because its necessity and the suffering undergone could all have been avoided ahd the appliances at hand not been studiously and maliciously
(1) See
B.F. Dowell's account of the killing of Peu-peu-mox-mox.
withheld by those whose duty it was to have performed that service in which the Oregon Volunteers were compelled to undergo so great a sacrifice. They perpetuate the record of the deeds of those who shared with their gallant colonel the honor of carrying the war into the enemy's country; and, in the region where our people had been murdered, the murderers met their just chastisement. They close the record of the campaign of their citizen soldiery, who contributed so vastly to saving Oregon and Washington settlements from desolation and destruction.
Under date of February 15, 1856, Governor Curry thus instructed Colonel Cornelius: "Your several communications to the second instant have been received.
"The recruit of your command, consisting of four companies, numbering about four hundred men, is now en route. A portion is beyond, and the remainder at this point. They will be pushed forward with the utmost dispatch. You will find the whole force well mounted, officered and equipped. Subsistence and adequate transportation for active operations during sixty days will be at your disposal; and it is not for a moment doubted that you will immediately prosecute, with energy, activity and success, the campaign in which your gallant company is engaged.
"Relying with confidence upon your skill and prudence, the plan of operations for the achievement of the object developed in general orders will be submitted mainly to your discretion, as it must necessarily be more or less influenced by circumstances every changing and constantly occurring. So far as practicable, the plan you will adopt will be controlled by the following suggestions.
"The dispirited and exhausted condition of the enemy, from the hardships, privations and disasters they have encountered during the winter thus far, will probably disincline them to engage the force under your command in a pitched battle. Detachments in sufficient force to maintain themselves successfully against any considerable body of the enemy, and not so distantly removed in the field of their operations from each other as to enhance the ordinary dangers of the service, will be calculated to promote effectually the desired issue. After crossing the Snake river, and before reaching the mouth of the Palouse, the main body of the Indians on the south side of the Columbia may be drawn into a general engagement by a display of but a portion of your force, the remainder being kept in reserve to act as circumstances may indicate. At the mouth of Snake river, or its vicinity, the Columbia may be crossed advantageously, and the country occupied by the Yakima and other Indians, on the north side of the Columbia, successfully penetrated. It is anticipated that the United States troops, in force, will be in the field about the middle of April. By, and perhaps before, that time, it is confidently expected that the volunteers will have achieved the purpose for which they were called out, and be ready to return to their long-suspended peaceful pursuits. When satisfactorily informed that the United States troops are in the field, and in a position to maintain the advantages conquered by the Oregon Volunteers, you will adopt such prudent measures as may be required to bring your command to The Dalles, when regulations will be made with a view to mustering out of the service. If practicable, it is desired that, before the return march shall be undertaken, the Yakima valley should be penetrated far enough to break up any encampments of the enemy existing in that section of the country.
"The post at Fort Henrietta you
will constantly maintain with a force of not less than thirty men, to be
reduced under no circumstances while the regiment remains in the field,
instructing the officers in command to scour the country in its vicinity
thoroughly, as the safety of the trains passing to and from The Dalles,
as well as the property at that post, must be, as far as possible, completely
assured."
On the 2d of April, 1856, Colonel Cornelius thus officially reported: "On the morning of the ninth ultimo, I dispatched Lieutenant Charles B. Pillow, Company A, of the First Battalion, in charge of a detachment of fifty men, to form an encampment at or near Fort Walla Walla. I gave him orders to hold that post, to scout the adjacent country, and to preserve open the line of communication from the mouth of the Snake river to our military post on the Umatilla. Having completed my preparations, on the same date I took up the line of march for Snake river with Companies A, D, E, H and K of the First Battalion, and A, B, C and D of the battalion of recruits, the command numbering about five hundred persons. We were supplied with full rations of sugar and coffee, and one-half rations of flour and beef, for the period of nine days. Beyond this we were destitute of supplies of any kind, the commissary department being wholly barren. The first night, we encamped on the Touchet. In the evening, Lieutenant Wright of Company E, whom I had previously dispatched to reconnoiter the mouth of Snake river, returned and reported he had discovered stock in the fork of the rivers, herded by Indians. The command did not move on the tenth, as I judged it advisable to await for one day the return of an express detachment I had been forced to send to The Dalles to obtain a needful supply of ammunition. Lieutenant Miller of Company H, with a detachment of that company, I sent beyond Mill creek to obtain cattle. He returned on the evening of the eleventh with twenty-one head of beef, which unfortunately effected their escape from us at Snake river.
"On the eleventh, we proceeded down the valley of the Touchet. The afternoon of the twelfth, after a march of forty-two miles from Camp Cornelius, we arrived on Snake river, twenty-five miles above its mouth; and, before nightfall, the command had accomplished the passage of the river, with the exception of Company A, Captain Harding, of the recruiting battalion. The transit over the river was made without loss or accident beyond the loss of two or three animals. On approaching the river, a very feeble encampment of Indians was perceptible on the opposite shore. Immediately after a portion of our advanced guard had crossed the river, I went in pursuit of the enemy, who had fled in the direction of the Columbia on observing our boats. A quantity of their packs and provisions, a small amount of ammunition and some horses were captured and brought into camp. Captains Hembree, Wilber, Reavis, Burch and Ankeny, and Lieutenant Miller, with portions of their respective companies, were engaged in this movement. We succeeded in killing four or five of the enemy, and captured one Indian boy of some four or five years. This last I have intrusted for the present to Captains Hembree and Ankeny. In the pursuit, two Indian women were overtaken. They were suffered to pass on unmolested.
"The succeeding day, Captain
Reavis, with a detachment of his men, Company K, and Lieutenant Taggart
of Company A, Second Battalion, with a detachment under command of Major
Cornoyer, struck across the country to the mouth of the Yakima; while Captains
Burch, Ankeny and Settle of the Second Battalion, with their companies,
under my immediate command, proceeded down the river to its mouth, and
thence up the Columbia for ten miles to opposite the mouth of the Yakima,
when we were met by the Indians. A small number were discovered, pursued,
and three or four killed. The remainder, with a small band of stock, had
succeeded in crossing the river before they could be overtaken. these fled
with great precipitancy towards the north. We returned to camp by different
routes, having traveled this day some seventy-five miles over a country
presenting no indications of having been occupied by a force of the war party of our enemy. While Lieutenant Small of Company K, and one other man, were together making their course to camp, they were fired upon by eight or ten Indians. The lieutenant returned their fire, succeeded in killing one of the Indians, and himself and companion escaped untouched. The same evening, private Harvey Robbins of Company D, was slightly wounded in the thigh with an arrow.
"The wagon train I had employed for the transportation of our boats, on the fourteenth I ordered to proceed to Walla Walla with five of the boats. One boat was cached on Snake river. On the afternoon of this day, I took up the line of march for the Palouse river, following the rough trail of the Snake. On the sixteenth, after a march of some forty miles from our crossing of Snake river, we encamped two miles below the Palouse. On this march, we discovered no manifestations that the country had been occupied during the past winter by any large body of Indians. At long intervals were to be noted evidences of temporary camps of a few families. Signs of numerous Indians having passed along the trail were perceptible. On arriving in the vicinity of the Palouse, I ordered Captain Hembree forward to ascertain if there was an encampment of the enemy at the mouth of that river. The same evening, he reported no Indians there, and no appearances of an encampment at or near that locality since late in the past autumn.
"On the seventeenth, I sent an express to the post at Walla Walla for supplies. We moved up the Palouse a distance of eight miles, and encamped until the morning of the twenty-third. Prior to reaching the Palouse, our scanty stock of provisions was exhausted; and we were reduced to the necessity of subsisting on horse meat. Many symptoms of strong reluctance to proceed further had been for several days manifested by a portion of the command. I called a council of the officers on the evening of the seventeenth, when it was determined to await the arrival of the provisions, and in the meantime to send out detachments to scout the country. On the eighteenth, Captains Hembree, Reavis, Burch and Ankeny, Lieutenants Hutchinson, Mears, wright and Haley, with detachments from Companies D, E, H and K of the First, and B and C of the Second, Battalion, under command of Lieutenant-Colonel Kelly, proceeded up the Palouse, and across the Colvile trail, to Clear creek. At the crossing of the creek, the Colonel divided his forces, sending one part, under Captain Hembree, down the creek to the Palouse, then up the Palouse, a distance of thirty miles from the encampment of the regiment. Colonel Kelly, with his party, moved up Clear creek a further distance of twelve miles, thence marched to Sinking Springs, on the trail leading from the falls of the Palouse to Priest's Rapids, and from that section pursued an easterly course to camp. The command of Lieutenant-Colonel Kelly was absent two days. They saw no Indians or cattle, and but one horse, which was appropriated by the men for their evening's meal. The Colonel reported that his command discovered a recent encampment; that it was evident that the whole body had crossed the country towards the Columbia; that no other camping ground of the Indians was found; and that there was but one trail leading from the Palouse river over the Palouse country to Priest's rapids. the day of the return of Colonel Kelly to camp, I dispatched a second express to Walla Walla for provisions. Fortunately, on this day we found, on the south side of Snake river, a band of forty Indian horses. With the assistance of a few men, I succeeded in driving them to camp. Most of the number were used for the subsistence of the regiment.
"On the morning of the twentieth,
I was induced, by a series of circumstances, to order a parade of the regiment,
at which I informed the command that it was my desire
and intention to follow the trail across the Palouse country to the Columbia, and to penetrate the country of the Yakima before I marched the command to The Dalles, and that such were your orders to me. I regret being under the painful necessity of stating the fact that one of the field officers exhibited his disrelish of my plan in a manner which he ought not to have suffered himself to have betrayed. Lieutenant-Colonel Kelly and Major Cornoyer, in unequivocal terms, expressed their decided approbation of the line of march I had proposed to pursue. On the twenty-first, Captain wilson, having in charge Watson's pack train with provisions, reached Snake river. Captain Cason of Company E, recruiting battalion, reported his command at Walla Walla ready for duty. I ordered him to form an encampment at the mouth of the Snake river, to scout the country on both sides of the river, and after the twenty-fourth to have our boats at that point prepared to cross any express I might forward, or the whole command. Watson's pack train brought rations of flour for twelve, and coffee for nine, days. From some mismanagement of the assistant quartermaster in the field, but two hundred pounds of coffee were forwarded to me. I had ordered four hundred and fifty pounds to be sent. At the time, there were some two or three thousand pounds of coffee at Walla Walla. Several instances of mismanagement have occurred in the quartermaster's department in the field that have seriously embarrassed my plans and movements. On Sunday the twenty-third, we resumed our march, taking along one of our boats, following the trail that had been discovered by Lieutenant-Colonel Kelly on the eighteenth and nineteenth en route to Priest's Rapids, and late on the twenty-sixth encamped on the banks of the Columbia.
"We were four days in traversing the country between the Palouse and Columbia rivers. Throughout the march, the men and animals suffered severely for want of water and subsistence. Numbers of horses became so exhausted that they were unable to travel. The route was exceedingly difficult. No man of the regiment had before penetrated the country. Not an Indian was seen. A very few miserably poor horses were secured, which were consumed as provisions. Captains Hembree and Harding and Lieutenant-Colonel Kelly, with five men, on the twenty-seventh, followed up the Columbia for several miles on the west bank of the Columbia; that they conversed together; that the Indians stated that they had no firearms and did not wish to fight; and that they declined to cross the river to our men. He further reported no more or different indications of the locality of the Indians than are presented in every part of the Palouse country.
"I was extremely solicitous to
cross the Columbia at the point we had attained, and pass directly into
the heart of the country of the Yakimas. At a council of my officers, I
submitted for consideration several propositions, one as to the expediency
of at once passing over the Columbia. The exhaustion of both men and animals,
the absence of supplies, and the uncertainty of obtaining provisions from
the trains supposed to be on the route to Walla Walla, in conjunction with
other causes, led to the determination that the command be marched on the
east side of the river to the mouth of the Yakima. Captain Cason arrived
at my camp this evening, and relieved our immediate wants by driving in
eight head of beef, captured by his company on the Umatilla. It now became
imperative to decide whether the country of Kamiakin should be entered
and thoroughly scouted. The troops of the United States were hourly expected
to arrive in the valley of the Walla Walla, and thus relieve the volunteers
of the duty they have for months performed, and enable them to return to
their homes.
"Governed by considerations that impressed me as the best and most prudent I could adopt under existing circumstances, I ordered Major Curl to take command of Companies H and K of the First Battalion, and A and D of the Second Battalion, proceed to Walla Walla river, form there an encampment, scout that valley to the base of the Blue Mountains, occupy the country until he was satisfied that a sufficient body of United States troops had come into the valley to hold the same, and march the command directly to the neighborhood of The Dalles. That command is now in the Walla Walla. To Captain Cason I gave an order to proceed with Company E to the headwaters of Wild Horse creek, the Umatilla and John Day rivers, into the Eureka valley and to The Dalles, by way of Warm Springs, to collect and drive in all the horses and cattle on the route, and arrest and hold in custody any and all white persons he might find in charge of stock. Captain Cason had departed to fulfill this mission. That same date I issued an order, to the regimental quartermaster and the commissary and their assistants, to withdraw all supplies, stores and property whatsoever, in their charge, from the field to The Dalles, whenever the left column of the regiment might vacate the country. The commanding officer of Company B of the First Battalion I have ordered to abandon Fort Henrietta, totally destroy that post, and march to The Dalles on the approach of the left column to the Umatilla. Lieutenant Pillow has been ordered to cross the Columbia with his force, and rejoin my command on the Yakima. On the last day of March I crossed the Columbia with Companies A, D and E of the First Battalion, and B and C of the Second Battalion. Lieutenant-Colonel Kelly, Major Cornoyer and Captain Revais accompanied me.
"On the first of the month, with Major Cornoyer, Captains Burch and Ankeny, Lieutenant Hult, and nine men, I followed up the Yakima river a distance of thirty miles. We found neither Indians nor evidences of an encampment since last autumn. Captain Hembree penetrated the country about the same distance. They report no recent traces of the enemy. Lieutenant-Colonel Kelly recrossed the Columbia in search of cattle, but returned without success.
"I had dispatched Lieutenant
Caldwell to Walla Walla for one thousand pounds of flour and twenty-five
rations of coffee. With this quantity, I proposed immediately to take up
the line of march through the Yakimas, and depend on the capture of wild
horses for all deficiency of provisions. Lieutenant Caldwell has returned,
and reports that Major Curl and Lieutenant Miller, despite his remonstrances,
took possession of four hundred pounds of flour, and that he succeeded
in obtaining but fourteen rations of coffee. With him came your express
messenger, Mr. Robinson, with your advices, and a communication from Captain
Pownall, the regimental quartermaster, and from Hubbard's wagon train.
A wagon and pack train with provisions are en route from The Dalles.
If they be not delayed or discharged at Fort Henrietta, which I am fearful
of, although I have given an order for the trains to push through direct
to Walla Walla, I have hope of obtaining such supplies as will enable me
to perform a campaign in the Yakima without danger of suffering for want
of subsistence. Quartermaster Pownall communicates that the Cascades have
been attacked by Indians, and that the United States troops, at that time
en
route to Walla Walla, had been recalled to The Dalles. Under the present
order of facts, I may find it indispensable for the public good to place
either Lieutenant-Colonel Kelly or Major Cornoyer in command of the troops
on the south of the Columbia river. I shall remain in this section of the
country until the arrival of the expected subsistence trains. I contemplate
a direct forward movement into the Yakima valley. I shall go through
the Klikitat valley. From that point my course must depend upon contingencies that may arise. I propose to send a force down the White Salmon river, and, if you deem it advisable, proceed by the mountains and valleys to the north on to Vancouver.
"In relation to the loss of Dowell's pack train, no supplies were obtained by the Indians. The animals were stolen about four o'clock on the morning of the 25th of February, on Wild Horse creek. Pursuit was given, but with no avail. I attribute the loss to carelessness on the part of the persons having the animals in charge. At the time the train left the Umatilla, Company A, of the battalion of recruits, was encamped about one mile from the train, and supposed it would be hazardous to leave the train, as it was to proceed to Camp Cornelius with Company A. In addition to this force, Hubbard's wagon train was proceeding with the pack train, and under the escort of Captain Harding."
The command of Colonel Cornelius had crossed the Columbia river on the 30th of March; but they were delayed in the march to the Yakima country, awaiting subsistence. On the 5th of April, with 241 men fit for duty, Colonel Cornelius commenced the march. No Indians were seen in the lower country. On the 6th of April, arriving at Cañon creek, the hostiles were met in force. On the next morning, Captain Hembree, with seven or eight others, rode out with the intent of going to the top of the ridge separating the valley they were in from Simcoe valley to reconnoiter. While ascending the hill, and when but a short distance from camp, they came upon a number of what seemed to be loose horses, which they carelessly approached. In a moment it was apparent that each horse was mounted, as form each an armed warrior rose, and charged upon Captain Hembree's squad. That officer was killed, but not until he had himself dispatched two of his Indian assailants. The others hastily retreated to camp and gave the alarm. Captain Cornoyer, with a detachment, swiftly pursued; but poor Hembree had been scalped and mutilated. The attempt of the Indians to stampede the horses of the command signally failed. Major cornoyer continued pursuing the savages all day, and finally came up with them at a place which they had fortified. His command charged them and killed six of their number without losing a man.
Upon the next day, the command returned to The Dalles, carrying along with them the body of Captain Hembree. Two Indians were met on their line of march, and killed. Arriving in Klikitat valley, the troops went into camp to recruit the animals and wait for further orders. On the 28th of April, a band of fifty hostiles stampeded the animals, and succeeded in driving off a large number.
During the month of May, 1856, the regiment, excepting the companies of Captains Wilson, Wilber and Haley, were mustered out. Those three companies were retained in service until August, when they were discharged. The muster rolls exhibit that during the service of the regiment there had been (including the re-enlistment) enlisted 1,455 men, including fifty-seven who became commissioned officers.
This chapter has copiously presented
the documentary record, tot he end that the conduct and motives of the
participants in the volunteer movement in the Oregon-Washington Indian
war may be fully exposed and exhibited. There was but a single act which
too signally, for a civilized race, betrayed an exultation over the corpse
of a deceased foe; and although that life had been marked with perfidy,
deceit and cruelty to our race, still should his lifeless body have been
exempt from such a treatment. That citizen soldiery, numbering nearly fifteen
hundred men, rank and file, have no occasion for other than patriotic pride
in the record that they made in their service as Oregon volunteers.