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CHAPTER VIII
THE INDIANS AND THE CIVIL WAR
Before the actual outbreak
of hositilities, in the winter of 1860, adherents
of the southern cause, among the most effectual and
influential of whom were the official agents of the
United States accredited to the Indian tribes, were
active in propagating the doctrines of secession among
the Cherokees and other tribes of Indians in the Territory.
Secret societies were organized, especially among
the Cherokees, and Stand Watie, the recognized
leader of the old Ridge or treaty party,was at the
head of the southern party. A counter organization
was formed among the loyally inclined portion of the
nation, who looked to John Ross as their leader.
This latter society termed themselves the "Kee-too-wha,"
a name by which the Cherokees were said to have been
known in their ancient confederation with other tribes.
The distinguishing badge of membership was a copper
pin worn in a certain position on the coat, vest or
hunting shirt. This gave rise to the common designation
of "Pin Indians" in referring to the loyal
party. According to the statement of General Albert
Pike, this "Pin" society was organized
and in full operation before the beginning of the
secession difficulties, and was really established
for the purpose of depriving the half-breeds of their
political power. It was also alleged to have been
established by Rev. Evan Jones, a missionary
for more than forty years among the Cherokees, as
an instrument for diseminating anti-slavery doctrines.1
As early as February 7, 1861, the Choctaw
Nation by resolutions in general council, expressed
its adherence to the south. In the event of dissolution
"we shall be left to follow the natural affections,
education, institutions, and interests of our people,
which indissolubly bind us in every way to the destiny
of our neighbors and brethren of the southern states."
Agents of the south were active among
the Indians in the early months of 1861, and it became
evident to the government even before the opening
of the war that occupation of the territory would
be impracticable. "The interests of the United
States are paramount to those of the friendly Indians
on the reservation near Fort Cobb," was the excuse
for the withdrawal of troops from that post and from
Fort Arbuckle, according to orders issued in the middle
of March.
Almost with the declaration of war, Texas
troops moved north against the posts in Indian Territory.
Lieutenant-Colonel W. H. Emory was in command
at Forts Washita, Cobb and Arbuckle. At the approach
of the Texans these posts were
[Footnote]
1"Much
excitement is reported to exist among the Cherokees,
and during the past year many murders and other crimes
and outrages have been perpetrated. A secret association
has been formed by the full-blood members of the tribe,
and the cause of all the existing difficulties is
attributable, it is alleged, to the missionaries amng
them who are charged with interfering with the institution
of slavery in the Cherokee Nation"—Report
of Commissioner of Indian Affairs Greenwood,
November 30, 1860.
85
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abandoned, the plan of concentration
having failed. Fort Arbuckle was surrendered May 5,
Washita was abandoned April 16, and on May 19, Colonel
Emory reported from his position in Kansas
on the way to Leavenworth with his entire command.
The Texas troops, after seizing the forts, turned
over the property to the Chickasaw Indians, and returned
to Texas.
It is evident that both the north and
the south represented each other to the Indians in
the worst possible light. Thus the secretary of war
of the Confederacy, addressing the Choctaw Nation
(May 13, 1861), refers to the wish of the Confederacy
"to secure the protection of these tribes in
their present country from the agrarian rapacity of
the north." The language used throughout by the
agents from both sides is such as would be employed
in convincing a puerile and ignorant people. In May,
1861, the Chickasaws formally declared allegiance
to the Confederate government, in resolutions that
passed both houses, and received the approval of Governor
Harrison on May 25. The resolutions are overweighted
with expressions of fear of the north's aggression
and the possible results of northern domination in
the Indian country. The "Lincoln hordes and Kansas
robbers" were held up as a fearful bugaboo to
the Indians.2
The plan of operations in Indian Territory
adopted by the Confederate government at the beginning
of the war, as outlined in a letter from Secretary
of War Walker, was as follows: General Ben McCulloch,
with the three regiments from Arkansas, Texas and
Louisiana, was commissioned to take charge of the
military district embracing the Indian country. To
co-operate with this command a mounted regiment was
to be raised by Douglas H. Cooper among the
Choctaws and Chickasaws and two other regiments among
the Creeks, Cherokees, Seminoles and other tribes.3
The Confederate government had little
difficulty in winning over the tribes in
[Footnotes]
2Whereas
the Lincoln Government, pretending to represent said
Union, has shown by its course towards us, in withdrawing
from our country the protection of the Federal troops,
and withholding, unjustly and unlawfully, our money
placed in the hands of the Government of the United
States as trustee, to be applied for our benefit,
a total disregard for treaty obligations toward us;
and whereas, our geographical position, our social
and domestic institutions, our feelings and sympathies,
all attach us to our southern friends, against whom
is about to be waged a war of subjugation or extermination,
of conquest and confiscation. . . .
Resolved, That our neighboring Indian
Nations—Choctaws, Cherokees, Creeks, Seminoles,
Osages, Senecas, Quapaws, Comanches, Kiowas, together
with the fragmentary bands of Delawares, Kickapoos,
Caddoes, Wichitas, and others within the Choctaw and
Chickasaw country, who are similarly situated with
ourselves, be invited to co-operate in order to secure
the independence of the Indian nations and the defense
of the territory they inhabit from northern invasion
by the Lincoln hordes and Kansas robbers, who have
plundered and oppressed our red brethren among them,
and who doubtless would extend towards us the protection
which the wolf gives to the lamb should the Chickasaws
pledge themselves to resist by all means, and to the
death, any such invasion of the lands occupied by
themselves or by any of the Indian nations; . . .
.
Resolved, That the governor of the Chickasaw
Nation be, and is hereby, instructed to issue his
proclamation to the Chickasaw Nation, declaring their
independence. (Extracts taken from Resolutions of
the Senate and House of Representatives of the Chickasaw
Legislature assembled, May 25, 1861.) (Ser. I, Vol.
III, War of Reb.)
3By special order from the
Confederate war department, November 22, 1861, "the
Indian country west of Arkansas and north of Texas,"
was constituted "the department of Indian Territory"
and Brigadier General Albert Pike was assigned
to command of the several Indian regiments in the
limits of the department. January 10, 1862, Indian
Territory was attached to "the Trans-Mississippi
district of Department No. 2," under command
of Major General Earl Van Dorn.
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southern Indian Territory to their allegiance.
The Choctaws, in general council June 10, 1861, following
the example of the Chickasaws, and in accordance with
their own previous expressions, declared themselves
absolved from treaty relations with the United States
and resolved upon an alliance with the south. George
Hudson, the principal chief, issued a proclamation
of these intentions and called upon his people for
enlistments in the military for field and home duty.
The Cherokee people were divided in sentiment,
the minority favoring active support of the Confederacy,
while the majority, headed by Chief John Ross,
endeavored to maintain a neutral position. Ross
communicated to General McCulloch in June,
1861, the desire of himself and the majority of his
people to refrain from active participation in the
war, and in sending this communication to the Confederate
department of war, McCulloch advised (June
22, 1861): "Under all the circumstances of the
case I do not think it advisable to march into the
Cherokee country at this time unless there is some
urgent necessity for it. If the views expressed in
my communication to you of the 14th inst. are carried
out, it will, I am satisfied, force the conviction
on the Cherokees that they have but one course to
pursue—that is, join the Confederacy. The Choctaw
and Chickasaw regiment will be kept on the south of
them; Arkansas will be on the east; and with my force
on the western border of Missouri no force will be
able to march into the Cherokee Nation, and, surrounded
as they will be by southern troops, they will have
but one alternative at all events. . . . I am satisfied
from my interview with John Ross and from his
communication that he is only waiting for some favorable
opportunity to put himself with the north. His neutrality
is only a pretext to await the issue of events."
Before the close of the first summer
the influences directed against neutrality were such
that the Cherokees, in a general meeting of the nation
at Tahlequah August 21, 1861, while approving the
neutral policy, at the same time recognized their
close relations to the south and submitted the questions
of future allegiance to the wisdom of the nation's
chiefs. The chiefs at once communicated to General
McCulloch their determination to join the south.
The defection of the Cherokees and their leader John
Ross was explained by United States Indian Agent
E. H. Curruth in the following way.4
"Two days before the convention
in which the Cherokee council voted by acclamation
to join the rebels, Mr. Ross stated that he
would die sooner than become a party to the rebellion.
. . . The convention had been called for the sole
purpose of reconciling differences between what is
known here as the Watie party and the full-blood
Indians. Stand Watie had raised a regiment
and been accepted into the rebel service. Mr. Ross
did all in his power to prevent a collision among
the Cherokees, and the convention of August 21 was
intended to harmonize the conflicting elements. .
. . Just at this time Mr. Ross learned that
Ben McCulloch and Stand Watie were to
united and overrun the Cherokee country, McCulloch
having assured Watie that he would crush out
the Union element of the tribe. He [McCulloch]
was then at Camp Walker with forces estimated at 14,000
men and expecting reinforcements. . . . The danger
was imminent; Ross wished to avert it, and
did so in the only possible way. He assured the convention
that the
[Footnote]
4Report
of Commissioner of Indian Affairs, 1862, Ex. Doc.,
3d sess.; 37th Cong., Vol. II.
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time had now arrived when he deemed
it necessary for the nation to take preliminary measures
to enter into treaty stipulations with the Confederate
states. A vote was immediately taken, and without
a dissenting voice John Ross was authorized
to sign the articles previously presented by the Confederate
commissioners."5
After the Tahlequah convention in August,
a Confederate regiment was organized among the Cherokees,
and Stand Watie,5 the leader of
the anti-Ross party, placed in command. A regiment
of home guards was also organized and the command
assigned to Colonel John Drew. One prominent
leader still remained loyal to the government, the
aged chief of the Creeks, Hopoeithleyohola.
When informed of the action of the Cherokees at Tahlequah,
he firmly refused to join the majority of his people
in allegiance to the southern states. At a council
of the Creeks he reminded them of the duties and obligations
by which they were bound to the government, and bitterly
complained that the Cherokees had been bought. But
the majority of the Creeks favored going with the
southern cause, and their treaty with the Confederate
commissioners resulted in a division of the nation
into two hostile parties. Hopoeithleyohola
gathered about him the loyal portion of the Creeks,
Seminoles, Kickapoos, Wichitas and Delawares, and
among the hills along the Arkansas river made a determined
stand for the Union.
The operations in Indian Territory during
the last months of 1861 consisted principally of the
movement against the loyal Indians under Chief Hopoeithleyohola.7
In the Middle of November a force of about 1,400 men,
consisting of six companies of the First Regiment
Choctaw and Chickasaw Mounted Rifles, and a part of
the Ninth Cavalry, besides the Creek regiment of Col.
D. N. McIntosh and the Creek and Seminole battalion
under Chilly McIntosh and Major John Jumper,
advanced along the Deep Fork of the Canadian
[Footnotes]
5John
Ross was born October 3, 1790, near Lookout Mountain,
Tennessee. His father, Daniel Ross, was a Scotchman,
and his mother a part-blood Cherokee. He was educated
at Kingston, Tennessee. His public career began when
he was nineteen years old, when he was sent by the
Cherokee agent on a mission to the western Cherokees,
then occupying territory now included in the boundaries
of the state of Arkansas. He served during the war
of 1812 as adjutant of a Cherokee regiment, under
General Jackson, that fought in the war against the
hostile Creeks in Florida. In 1817 he became a member
of the national committee of the council of the Cherokee
people, and two years later, at the age of thirty,
was president of the committee, in which capacity
he served until 1826. In 1827 he was associate chief
of the nation with William Hicks as principal chief,
and was president of the convention of that year,
which framed the first national constitution. In 1828
he became principal chief of the eastern Cherokee
and when, in 1838, they removed to the west, he became
principal chief of the united tribe, and held that
office until his death, which occurred in Washington
on August 1, 1866. It seems impossible to form a correct
judgment as to Ross' loyalty and actions during
the Civil war. He was distrusted by the south, as
we have seen, and was held to have been forced into
a southern allegiance, though steadfastly Union in
sentiment. Yet, at the close of the war, when the
United States commission treated with the Indian at
Fort Smith, it was claimed that incriminating evidence
had been found showing that Ross had been a secret
enemy of the government during the war, and on this
ground he was excluded from participation in the council,
though his people continued to profess faith in his
loyalty and wisdom.
6Stand Watie, according
to the testimony of Gen. R. M. Gano, under
whom the Cherokee chief served for a time, was a brave
and valuable soldier. He would stand without flinching
in face of a heave fire of hand arms, says General
Gano, but when the artillery opened and the
whistle and crash of a shell came near, although the
danger was much less, Watie's stolid fearlessness
vanished, and on one occasion at least he was seen
to take refuge behind a tree.
7War of the Rebellion, Ser.
1, Vol. VIII.
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toward the stronghold of the old Creek
chieftain, who courageously held out for the Union
cause to the end. The Union Indians were not overtaken
until the Red Fork was crossed, and on the evening
of November 19 ensued a skirmish at "Round Mountain"
in which a number of men on each side were lost. The
Union forces continued to withdraw, and the following
morning the Confederates took possession of the deserted
camp.
The diversion of the forces under Colonel
Cooper to repel the threatened invasion into Arkansas
by General Fremont afforded a short respite
from hostilities to the Indian Country. Fremont's
retreat left Colonel Cooper free to continue
his expedition against Hopoeithleyohola, and
after a few days' rest at Spring Hill near Concharta
his force of 780 men was put in motion on November
29 in the direction of Tulsey Town. A few miles north
of this Indian village, on Bird creek, a junction
of the Confederate forces was effected, and here on
the 9th of December was fought the battle of Chusto-Talsah.
About 11 o'clock in the morning Colonel
Cooper had crossed the creek and proceeded down
on the east side, with a view of taking a position
which would enable him to keep open communication
with the depot at Coweta Mission and with reinforcements
of Creeks, Seminoles and Choctaws who were expected
at Tulsey Town. His official report of the ensuing
events is as follows: "After proceeding down
Bird creek about five miles two runners from Captain
Foster reached me at the head of the column, stating
he had found the enemy in large force below. Parks
had exchanged a few shots with them, taken six prisoners
and was retreating, hotly pursued. Scarcely had this
intelligence reached me before shots were heard in
the rear. . . . The forces were formed in three columns,
the Choctaws and Chickasaws on the right, the Texans
and Cherokees in the center, and the Creeks on the
left, and the whole advanced at quick gallop upon
the enemy, who had by this time shown himself in large
force above us, along the timber skirting the main
creek for over two miles, as well as a ravine extending
far out into the prairie."
After some skirmishing in the rear and
with that portion of the enemy along the ravine, the
forces advanced to the position of the main engagement.
"The position then taken up by the enemy at Chusto-Talasah,"
reported Col. Cooper, "presented almost
insurmountable obstacles to our troops. The creek
made up to the prairie on the side of our approach
in an abrupt, precipitous bank, some thirty feet in
height, at places cut into steps, reaching near the
top and forming a complete parapet, while the creek,
being deep, was fordable but at certain points known
only to the enemy. The opposite side, which was occupied
by the hostile forces, was densely covered with heavy
timber, matted undergrowth and thickets, and fortified
additionally by prostrate logs. Near the center of
the enemy's line was a dwelling house, a small corn
crib and rail fence, situated in a recess of the prairie,
at the gorge of a bend of the creek for horseshoe
form, about 400 or 500 yards in length. This bend
was thickly wooded and covered in front, near the
house, with long interwoven weeds and grass, extending
to a bench, behind which the enemy could lie and pour
upon the advancing line his deadly fire in comparative
safety, while the creek banks on either side covered
the house by flank and reverse."
The different divisions of the Confederates,
charging, forced their way under hot fire across the
creek, and engaging the enemy often in close at hand
conflict in the
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timber and over the rough ground finally
forced them back. The engagement lasted three or four
hours, and the advantages varied from side to side
several times. "The enemy disappeared from our
entire front, and the sun having set, the troops were
withdrawn and marched to camp. . . . On the next morning
the Choctaw and Chickasaw regiment, the Creek regiment,
Colonel Drew and his Cherokees and a portion
of the Texas regiment returned to the battle ground.
The enemy had retreated to the mountains."
After the battle on Bird creek the Confederate
forces returned to Fort Gibson to reorganize, their
victory having been dearly bought. There Col. James
McIntosh with 2,000 troops was preparing for a
campaign against Hopoeithleyohola. McIntosh, Stand
Watie and Cooper now began a concerted
movement against the old Creek chief. About noon of
the 26th of December, McIntosh's troops, which
were in advance, approached Shoal creek, a tributary
of the Verdigris, and on crossing the stream were
subjected to the fire of Hopeithleyohola's
men, who were posted on a high and rugged hill with
its side covered with oak trees.
"The enemy was in a very strong
position" (Colonel McIntosh's report),
"and from it observed our actions, in happy innocence
of the gallant resolve which animated the hearts of
those in the valley below them. The Seminoles, under
the celebrated chief, Halek Tustenuggee, were
in front on foot, posted behind the trees and rocks,
while others were in line near the summit of the hill.
Hopeithleyohola's Creeks were beyond, on horseback.
A few representatives of other tribes were also in
the battle. . . . Between the rough and rugged side
of the hill a space of 200 or 300 yards intervened
of open ground. Each tree on the hillside screened
a stalwart warrior. It seemed a desperate undertaking
to charge a position which appeared almost inaccessible,
but the order to charge to the top of the hill met
a responsive feeling from each gallant heart in the
line, and at 12 m. the charge was sounded, one wild
yell from a thousand throats burst upon the air, and
the living mass hurled itself upon the foe."
The Union forces were gradually driven from their
positions, and retreated to the rocky gorges amid
the deep recesses of the mountains, where they were
pursued, and were finally forced to yield their last
stand at their encampment. "The battle lasted
until 4 o'clock, when the firing gradually ceased,
and we remained victors in the center of Hopoeithleyohola's
camp. . . . The stronghold of Hopoeithleyohola
was completely broken up, and his force scattered
in every direction, destitute of the simplest elements
of subsistence." Stand Watie followed
the defeated Indians the next day, overtook them,
and in a running fight killed fifteen of them.
After the loyal Indians were defeated
in the third battle, the scattered remnants, with
their old men, women and children, were compelled
to flee for their lives from the Indian's country,
and to the number of from 6,000 to 8,000, still led
by the dauntless old Creek who had directed them in
battle, took refuge near the southern border of Kansas.
Here they were fed during the winter of 1861-62 from
stores of General Hunter. "It would be
impossible," reads the Indian commissioner's
report for 1862, "to give an adequate description
of the suffering endured by these people during their
flight, and for several weeks after their arrival.
When it is remembered that they were collected for
the journey with scarcely a moment for preparation,
amid the confusion and dismay of an overwhelming defeat;
that their enemies
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were close upon them . . . it may well
be believed that their preparations for the journey
were wholly inadequate. It was in the dead of winter,
the ground was covered with ice and snow, and the
weather most intensely cold. Without shelter, without
adequate clothing, and almost destitute of food, a
famishing, freezing multitude of fugitives, they arrived
in Kansas entirely unexpectedly. . . .Within two months
after their arrival 240 of the Creeks alone died.
. . . Over a hundred frosted limbs were amputated
within a like period of time."
The situation in the part of Indian Territory
north of the Arkansas during the early months of 1862
is described in a report, dated May 1, 1862, from
Baptiste Peoria, who had been sent as "United
States special agent" to observe the state of
feelings among the Cherokees. He says: "A Cherokee
by the name of Stanwaite [Stan Watie],
together with a white man by the name of Coffee,
have been occupying that portion of the Cherokee country
along the line of Arkansas and Missouri and the southern
line of Kansas for some six months. Stanwaite
was upon the neutral lands last March, threatening
and driving off settlers and burning their houses.
Coffee has a scouting company of two or three
hundred with which he watches the line. . . . The
Cherokees are the most powerful tribe in the Indian
Territory, and the smaller tribes are afraid of them.
Stanwaite and Coffee are now watching
the line between Kansas and the Cherokee country.
Whenever a force moves down into that country they
retreat to Fort Gibson, where they claim to have large
forces, some five or six thousand, composed in part
of Texans and Arkansans."8
The battle of Pea Ridge, or Elkhorn,
in March, 1862, reversed the conditions of the opposing
forces in Indian Territory. Up to that time, as a
result of the victories over Hopoeithleyohola,
the confederate supremacy in Indian Territory was
undisputed. With the Elkhorn disaster, however, the
southern troops were compelled to retreat to Arkansas,
and at the same time the loyalty of the Indian allies
was much shaken, the Cherokee regiment commanded by
Colonel Drew deserting, soon after, to the
Union army. Many of the troops of the Trans-Mississippi
department were moved east in anticipation of the
grand contest at Corinth, and Missouri, Arkansas and
Indian Territory was left almost entirely exposed
to any movements that a considerable Union force might
project within their borders.
After the defeat of the loyal Creeks
in 1861, an expedition was planned by the Union government
to enter the Territory and offer protection to the
Indians. This was known as the Indian expedition,
including two regiments of white troops and about
two thousand loyal Indians, which after a delay of
some months finally marched south about July, 1862.
The Indian regiments had been organized to act in
the capacity of home guards for Indian territory and
adjacent country. They were commanded by white officers
and were sent against the enemy in co-operation with
a small body of white troops.
Major General T. C. Hindman, in
his general report to the Confederate department of
war, said, referring to this expedition: "The
federal Indian expedition was moving from Fort Scott,
and its advance had crossed the Cherokee line. To
meet this force, 5,000 strong, we had only the brave
Stand Watie, with his faithful regiment of
half-breed Cherokees; Drew's regiment
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of full-bloods, many of whom were disaffected,
and Clarkson's battalion of Missourians, raised
under my orders, and sent there at the urgent request
of Watie and Drew. . . . This small
command encountered the enemy and was defeated. Clarkson
was captured, with his train, and many of his men
dispersed. Except a small body under the gallant Capt.
Pickens Benge, Drew's regiment deserted
to the enemy. With a courage never surpassed, Stand
Watie still resisted. On one occasion a portion
of his regiment, under Major E. C. Boudinot,
repulsed the federal advance of fivefold greater strength.
But it was not possible to make head against such
odds, and he was at length compelled to fall back
beyond the Arkansas. The full-bloods, or Pin Indians,
now rose in rebellion and committed horrible excesses.
John Ross, the Cherokee chief, was pretendedly
taken prisoner, but, as afterwards appeared, really
went over to the enemy with the archives and money
of the nation.
Col. William Weer, as commanding
officer of the Indian expedition, was unable to control
his troops, and on July 19, 1862, while encamped on
Grand river, matters came to climax with the arrest
of Colonel Weer by Col. F. Salomon,
who then assumed command. This meeting, as it was
in effect, brought confusion to the entire expedition,
and resulted in the retreat of the white forces, leaving
the three Indian regiments behind to fight the enemy's
forces. The objects of the expedition were completely
defeated, and the country, restored for a brief time
to the loyal Indians, was laid open to a still more
ruthless raiding by the scouting band of Confederates.
Early in August, because of a threatened movement
against Fort Scott, Colonel Salomon withdrew
into Kansas, leaving Fort Gibson and the valley of
the Arkansas quite at the mercy of Stand Watie
and his southern allies.
In the latter part of September, 1862,
Brigadier General J. M. Schofield was assigned
to command of the operations in the southwest, and
an aggressive movement was begun to recover the ground
lost in the preceding summer. With General Blunt's
command co-operating, he moved from Springfield, Missouri,
into northwest Arkansas. In the meantime the Confederate
forces under Cooper had gone in the direction
of Maysville, while Rains' cavalry command
was learned to be in the neighborhood of Huntsville.
General Blunt was sent in pursuit of Cooper,
and overtaking him in his camp at Old Fort Wayne,
in the Indian Territory, defeated him in a sharp engagement,
and captured his artillery. This battle, of October
22, was of decisive importance. Stand Watie
was forced beyond the Arkansas, and his forces disorganized.
The federals advanced with little opposition to take
possession of the Cherokee country, and in the course
of the following months captured Forts Gibson and
Smith.9
[Footnotes]
9Major
General Blunt's report of the battle of Fort
Wayne is as follows: ". . . . Having learned
from my scouts (sent out during the day) that Cooper
and Stand Watie were at or near Maysville with
a force variously estimated at from 5,000 to 7,000
men, I determined, if possible, to reach their camp
and attack them at daybreak. The distance to march
was 30 miles, and the road through a rough, wooded,
and hilly country. Three miles from Bentonville I
directed my train to go into camp and follow in the
morning at daylight, and moved the column forward,
Colonel Cloud's brigade being in advance.
"At about 2 o'clock in the morning
the advance was halted by Colonel Cloud, with
a view of letting the column close up. The men were
weary and exhausted, and no sooner were they halted
than they dropped down in the brush by
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of the Union army were in possession
of Fort Gibson, and nominally had regained the territory
north of the Arkansas. But the difficulty of holding
such a country, whose inhabitants were about equally
divided in loyalty to the north and south, is indicated
in a report by Col. W. A. Phillips, in command
of the Union expedition from
the roadside and were
soon fast asleep. Being in the rear of Colonel Cloud's
brigade, after waiting half an hour at a halt,
I took a portion of my body guard, went ahead to learn
the cause of the delay, and ordered the command to
be moved on, going myself with the advance guard.
After proceeding on 5 miles farther an open prairie
lay before us of some 5 miles in extent, over which
we had to pass to reach the rebel camp. At this point
I went ahead of the advance guard, accompanied by
Captain Russell, of the Second Kansas Regiment,
and 2 men, for the purpose of gathering information.
In this we succeeded admirably. Stopping at a large,
fine house at the edge of the prairie, and disguised
as a rebel just escaped from the Federals and wishing
to get with Cooper's command, I readily enlisted
the sympathies of the lady, whose husband was a soldier
in the rebel camp. She informed me where their pickets
stood, of the location of their camp and of their
strength, which was near 7,000 men, two Texas regiments
having joined them the day before. I now moved the
advance across the prairie and halted a quarter of
a mile from their outpost, which was at the edge of
the timber, on a little wooded stream, near the town
of Maysville. From this point I sent Companies B and
I, of the Second Kansas, under the command of Captain
Hopkins, by a circuitous route,to enter the
town in the rear of the enemy's pickets for the purpose
of, if possible, capturing them without alarming the
camp. This, however, proved fruitless, from the fact,
as I afterwards learned, that they heard us advancing
across the prairie and ran in, alarming the town as
they went, from which all the male inhabitants speedily
decamped to seek rebel protection.
"It was now near 5 o'clock, and
my desire was to attack at daylight; but, while waiting
to give Captain Hopkins time to get in the
rear of their pickets, on going back to ascertain
if the column was closed up I learned, much to my
surprise and disappointment, that during the last
two or three hours' march the only troops with me
had been three companies of the Second Kansas, two
of which had already been sent ahead under Captain
Hopkins. The main column was back 7 miles,
where it was first halted. After sending a messenger
back to order it up I proceeded with the one company
remaining with me to the town, and reached there at
the same time with Captain Hopkins. There I
learned that intelligence of our approach had gone
ahead of us and, fearing that the enemy would retreat,
I sent Colonel Cloud (who had come with me
in the advance) back to move his brigade forward as
rapidly as possible, while with the three companies
I determined to push ahead, attack the enemy, and
endeavor to hold them until re-enforcements could
arrive. Finding an intelligent contraband, whose master
was in the rebel camp, with the locality of which
he was well acquainted, I had no difficulty, by promising
him his freedom, in engaging his services as a guide.
The route from Maysville to the timber, where the
rebels were posted, lay across the prairie, in a south-westerly
direction, about 3 1/2 miles distant. Dashing on rapidly
we drove their pickets from the open ground under
cover of the timber. The remainder of the Second Kansas,
with the two mountain howitzers attached, now came
galloping up and the whole regiment was quickly formed
into line and, under command of Lieutenant-Colonel
Bassett, was ordered to skirmish the woods
on foot to ascertain the position of the enemy. At
this point 5 of my body guard captured 10 armed rebels,
who had been out of camp and were endeavoring to get
back to their command.
"Lieuteneant-Colonel Bassett,
not being able to ascertain the whereabouts of the
rebel forces, was ordered to withdraw his men from
the woods and remount them.
"Advancing through an opening in
the timber, about a quarter of a mile in width, I
discovered the enemy in force, their line extending
across the open ground in front and occupying the
road. Between the point I occupied (reconnoitering
their position and movements) and their line was a
pasture of open ground. Believing that the enemy were
contemplating a retreat, I determined to lose no time
in trying the effect of a few shells upon their ranks
from the two little mountain howitzers. The Second
Kansas was accordingly moved forward in line to the
first fence, and the two howitzers, under the command
of Lieut. E. S. Stover, supported by Company
A of the Second Kansas, under Lieutenant Johnston,
were ordered to advance through the fence to within
200 yards of the enemy's battery, from which position
Lieutenant Stover opened upon them with shell
and with much animation. The fire was returned by
the enemy's guns, and in a few minutes their entire
line engaged the small force I had opposing
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Cane Hill into the Cherokee Nation.
This report, dated Christmas morning, states that
Watie's regiment was scattered over the nation in
parties, the preceding day having been spent in pursuit
of these detached bands. Scanland's Texan company
was at Scullyville with Cooper, Livingston with some
Indian forces was at Webber's, and some Choctaws and
Creeks were about Lee's creek. " The scattered
condition of the enemy," continues the report,
"the rain, swollen condition of streams, and
scarcity of forage renders it extremely difficult
to carry out the order to clear the enemy out of the
country, but I will try. As to moving, families without
number wish to leave, but I have no transportation
for them. I must move toward Webber's to feel for
the enemy, who may concentrate there. Colonel Waite
has taken all the horses and wagons out of the country,
and the order 'to assist those who want to leave'
I find it difficult to do, for want of wagons. I may
get some, but deem it hardly expedient to cross the
Arkansas in its present state with little low ferry-boats,
until I know hat I am doing or hear again from Van
Buren."
About January 8, 1863, Brig. Gen. William
Steele assumed command of the Confederate forces in
Indian Territory, relieving Major General Hindman
at Fort Smith.10 He found the country in
an exhausted condition, and the few troops under his
command undisciplined, ill-equipped and demoralized.
The continuous occupation of the country by a large
Confederate force from the beginning of the war had
utterly exhausted its resources, and the withdrawal
of the Confederate troops a short time before had
left the people despondent and hopeless. Instead of
a full regiment, General Steele found but 250 men
ready for duty, but without provision of clothing
or supplies. North of Red river the country was controlled
by the Union forces, while jayhawkers overran both
sides of the river between Little Rock and Fort Smith.
Fort Gibson was held by a force of federals estimated
[Footnotes]
them. I then dismounted
the entire regiment (The Second Kansas), formed them
on foot, and ordered them to advance through the fence
to within short range of the enemy's position, which
order was obeyed with alacrity, they opening upon
the rebel lines a terrific fire with their Harper's
Ferry rifles. The enemy, observing our small force
upon the field, the main column having not yet come
in sight, attempted to overwhelm us by superior numbers,
and by flank movements, to obtain possession of the
projecting woods on my right and left. Fortunately,
at this juncture the Sixth Kansas, Colonel Judson,
and the Third Cherokee Regiment, Colonel Phillips,
came upon the field. The former was ordered to advance
upon the right and the latter on the left, which they
did by rapid movements, driving back the flanking
columns of the enemy. At the same moment Company B,
Captain Hopkins; Company D, Lieutenant Moore;
Company E, Captain Gardner; Company H, Lieutenant
Ballard, and Company K, Captain Russell,
of the Second Kansas, all under command of Capt. S.
J. Crawford, made a gallant charge, driving in
their center, capturing their artillery, and bringing
it in triumph from the field. The battle was now won,
and the enemy began fleeing in disorder before our
victorious troops. The Second Indiana Battery, Lieutenant
Rabb, came up in time to pay its respects to
the rear of the fleeing rebels with excellent effect.
Colonel Judson, of the Sixth Kansas, and Colonel Phillips,
of the Third Cherokee Regiment, pursued them in their
retreat for a distance of 7 miles, skirmishing with
their rear and leaving quite a number of their dead
strewn by the way, when, their horses becoming exhausted
from the long and wearisome march of the night before,
they were obliged to give up farther pursuit. The
rebels, I have since learned, did not halt in their
retreat until they had reached the Arkansas river,
at Fort Gibson, 70 miles from the battle ground, where
they arrived thirty hours after their rout at old
Fort Wayne." (From War of the Rebellion. Official
Records of the Union and Confederate Armies, Series
I, Vol. XIII, p. 325).
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95
at from 2,500 to 3,500, under Major
Gen. James G. Blunt. The Confederate troops
co-operating with General Steele were those under
command of General Cooper, and the regiments
of Stand Watie and McIntosh. Early in
the spring General Steele instituted an aggressive
movement against Fort Gibson, with the design of clearing
that section of the country of the union forces. But
owing to the failure of the different regiments to
co-operate effectively, the trains of reinforcements
and supplies came safely through from the north, and
thus strengthened the federals were able to assume
the offensive against the Confederates, who were then
encamped at Honey Springs. In the course of the efforts
to prevent the Union trains from reaching Fort Gibson,
Stand Watie had attacked the escort under Colonel
Phillips on May 28th, and a skirmish ensued
near Fort Gibson, in which 35 rebels were reported
killed, and five Union soldiers were killed. After
this skirmish a regiment of Kansas colored troops
and other reinforcements were sent into the Territory.
It was recognized that a withdrawal of the Union forces
from the Arkansas would be disastrous to the Indian
country and greatly demoralize the Indian troops.
The reports of the commanding officers from both sides
indicate a lack of steady patriotism on the part of
the Indians, their service being rather of the nature
of a voluntary contribution than an obligation of
duty.
On July 17, 1863, was fought the battle
of Honey Springs, on Elk creek, not far from Fort
Gibson. The Confederates having failed in their movement
against Fort Gibson and in preventing the arrival
of reinforcements at that point, General Cooper
was encamped at Honey Springs, awaiting the arrival
of Cabell's Arkansas brigade. General Blunt,
who had taken command in person at Fort Gibson, now
moved out, with a force of about 3,000, and attacked
Cooper's force. Cooper, from his own
report, knew of the advance of the enemy twenty-four
hours before they arrived, and was also informed of
the approach of Cabell's troops, but decided
to give battle upon the ground he occupied, without,
as was charged, taking any steps to strengthen his
position or trying to effect a junction with Cabell.
After a short contest he was driven from the field,
reporting the loss of one howitzer and about 200 men
killed, wounded and captured.11
This defeat caused a rapid desertion
among the Arkansas troops, and the Indian
[Footnotes]
11The
report of General Blunt of the Union forces,
of this engagement, is as follows: The rebels, under
General Cooper (6,000), were posted on Elk
Creek, 25 miles south of the Arkansas, on the Texas
road, with strong outposts guarding every crossing
of the river from behind rifle-pits. General Cabell,
with 3,000 men, was expected to join him on the 17th,
when they proposed attacking this place. I could not
muster 3,000 effective men for a fight, but determined,
if I could effect a crossing, to give them battle
on the other side of the river. At midnight of the
15th, I took 250 cavalry and four pieces of light
artillery, and marched up the Arkansas about 13 miles,
drove their pickets from the opposite bank, and forded
the river, taking the ammunition chests over in a
flat-boat. I then passed down on the south side, expecting
to get in the rear of their pickets at the mouth of
the Grand river, opposite this post, and capture them,
but they had learned of my approach and had fled.
I immediately commenced crossing my forces at the
mouth of the Grand River in boats and, by 10 p. m.
of the 16th, commenced moving south, with less than
3,000 men, mostly Indians and negroes, and twelve
pieces of artillery. At daylight I came upon the enemy's
advance about 5 miles from Elk Creek, and with my
cavalry drove them in rapidly upon their main force,
which was formed on the south side of the timber of
Elk Creek, their line extending 1 1/2 miles, the main
road running through their center.
While the column was closing up, I went
forward with a small party to examine the enemy's
position, and discovered that they were concealed
under cover of the brush awaiting my attack. I could
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