No finer companionship could have possibly been found than that which was ever available at the CAT Club. They were interested in anything I might wish to tell them about my recent experiences but never pressing in questions about it. The recent loss of one of their own members was as often the topic of conversation. They all wondered my thoughts as to prospects for his return. There was a unique aspect of the way they spoke about Norm's disappearance. They missed him. But they did not mourn him; at least not in the way most people now seem to think of mourning. For these were all men of venturesome spirit. Such men can and do enjoy one another's physical company. But they are not dependent upon it. For even when somebody of their membership is not present, the venturesome spirit which has governed that body remains in communion with them. And that would pertain no matter if said body was absent temporarily or might be gone forever.

Such, then, were their evident feelings about Norm Schwartz. They hoped still, despite being now quite long unheard might still be alive and yet one day return. My own return after having been widely regarded as dead, undoubtedly heightened there hopes for him in some measure. But if he didn't make it back physically, he would ever remain otherwise with them. My own comfort in their company derived therefore from far more than just their consideration of my circumstance. By the way they had welcomed me, and accepted my presence among them, I knew that they felt the same about me as they did about Norm.

On Sept 20, just one week after submitting the formal statement of charges, when 1 phoned in to the debriefing room at the hospital the yeoman told me Lt. Decker wanted me to return on the following afternoon. Also, he had something of his own he was eager to tell me: "Y'know that little scroll you gave to Lt. Decker — ? I've now got a report back on all of 'em, Chief. All present and accounted for!"

Upon arrival at the hospital the following afternoon, Decker informed me we would be going that evening to meet with an Army officer who wanted to "discuss" some things about my charges against Naylor-Foote. Decker was not at liberty to tell me much of what otherwise had happened or was happening as result of my formal statement. He could, however, answer my question as to whether a Court of Inquiry would be convened to look into the charges directly. Navy's immediate demand for that had been blocked by Army's G-2 section's claim that this would be too great risk of classified information relating to "nationl security." Whether or not that claim was valid (and documents released 30 years later indicate that its validity was very doubtful) it bore out my concern even while it was being drafted that I might have expressed the charges too mildly. They were presented in the written statement as a "probability," (counting on the ease with which direct inquiry would have shown them to be true), rather than candidly and direct as had been done verbally to Decker and Hess. As it was presented in the formal statement:

"There is indication, by the facts to be presented herein, that the failure of this mission and the resulting loss of personnel and equipment, is due primari1y to incorrect information given to me . . . by 1st Lt NAYLOR-FOOTE. There is further indication that NAYLOR-FOOTE was aware of the true facts at the time he gave me this information, and that the facts were falsified with intent to deceive me, for undetermined reasons. Also involved and implicated by some of the information to be set forth herein, is Capt ULATOSKI, US ARMY, a member at the time of this mission of the same unit to which NAYLOR-FOOTE was attached...."

The main concern was that inclusion in the formal statement itself of considerable detail about statements and actions of Naylor-Foote and Ulatoski, before, during and after the mission could cause investigators either to overlook or ignore the basic charge that Naylor-Foote had deliberately lied about Ettinger's fitness for hoist pickup. It might also enable deliberate evasion of that basic issue by, focusing attention on some of those other details.

The meeting that evening with the Army officer who had told Decker he wanted to "discuss" the matter with me went a long way towards proving that might happen. Some 470 pages of declassified documents released to me thirty years later, related to Army G-2's investigation of its own and of itself, prove beyond doubt that it did happen.

US Army Capt S. C. Robertson could without apology be described in physical appearance as a big, fat slob. He was ensconced in an apartment somewhere in Tokyo, wherein there was nothing in view to indicate even remote association with the US Army. His manner of greeting was not merely incongenial, it felt totally disrespectful. 1 suspected before he uttered a word that he was probably involved in the debriefing of Naylor-Foote and possibly a personal friend or at least colleague of sorts. His opening remarks (as contained in transcript of our dialogue declassified 30 years later) made clear he didn't seek discussion with me. It was very officious, and gruffly so:

"Chief Thorin, you are hereby reminded that your rights under Article 31 of Uniform Code of Military justice have been explained to you and that any statements you make during this interrogation are susceptible to application of this Article. Do you understand that?"

So impressed did he appear with his own importance that it is unlikely he perceived the subtle intonation of my "Yes, sir," in response. His next words confirmed that he was in some way connected with Naylor-Foote's debriefing:

"Very well, for the first question: What statements did Lt Naylor-Foote make to you about his first helicopter rescue attempt, which preceded the one which you and he mutually engaged?"

Assuming that he was asking for what Naylor-Foote had told me about it before our actual mission, (which was also infact all that Naylor-Foote had ever stated directly to me about it), I limited my response to that. From the transcript:

"DWT: "The statements he made about that were to the effect that he had arranged for Admiral Martin's helicopter, that both pilots from that helicopter unit and himself, had gone into the area, flown over it looking for the agents and for the man that was to be picked up — Ettinger. That this had occurred about a week or ten days previous to my mission, that they were unable to locate any signs of anybody and that they were pretty badly shot up in the process. That essentially is it."

"SCR: "Are there any other details that you wish to add, or do you feel that you've covered it fully in that statement?"

"DWT: "I believe that I've covered it fully in that statement."

That did in fact cover what Naylor-Foote had said to me about his fictitious "first rescue attempt" prior to the mission. He probably had wanted to tell me more at that time. At that point in his telling of it, I had no reason to even think that it was a fictitious story. There was also no reason to want to hear details of it. My attention was then focused on planning a mission, which might or might not be done, depending upon what further information Ulatoski would provide later from the island. Ironically, had I heard at that time only the very next sentence or two of Naylor-Foote's usual presentation of that particular one of his fantasies, the actual mission then being considered would have been "scrubbed" at once. For an integral part of his story about that fictional "first rescue attempt" was that, in addition to the helicopter's pilot (whose name he could never remember), riding "shotgun" with him on that valiant venture was a Marine Captain (whose name he also could never remember).

No helicopter pilot would have taken two men with him in an H03S to try to pick someone up, for the simple reason that the H03S lacked the lifting capacity to be certain of doing it!

By his asking of that first question, I knew for certain that Robertson was in considerable measure involved with Naylor-Foote, and would have heard from him a full account of that fictitious "first rescue attempt." The impulse to say in response to the second question that the story of a previousrescue attempt was a lie, was resisted because I expected the pompous fellow to pursue the matter further. And I wanted him to do so; wanted him to ask for it, rather than myself volunteering it. Having sensed Robertson's animosity towards myself, I wanted that he should invite what would have been to him a very shocking statement, disruptive of whatever line of questioning he had a worked up for me in advance.

Most unfortunately he did not do so. He proceeded at once to another subject, obviously in accordance with a previously planned series of questions. Thus was lost the opportunity to expose at once a key element of the entire affair — the fact that Lt Naylor-Foote was a pathological liar.

There was no immediate opportunity for myself to return the conversation to that subject. At the time it didn't seem too important to do so at once, because it was likely to be brought up again soon, by someone else, if not again by Robertson. But no one did so with myself while I remained in Tokyo. And my clear statement to Lt Decker — relayed by him to Army people — judging by the documents released thirty years later, appears to have been generally ignored by Army investigators and analysts ever after.

In fact, judging by those documents, only one individual among all the Army analysts who were involved gave much consideration to even the possibility that Naylor-Foote's story about a previous rescue attempt was only a figment of his pathological imagination. That one was Miss Mary Jane Finke, a civilian employee of GS-7 rating, in Army's G2 section in Washington, DC. "Under the guidance of ... MONROE J. HAGOOD, Lt Col., Inf., Spec Ass't to the G2," Miss Finke was assigned to do a study of what by then was being called "The Naylor-Foote Case."

Miss Finke wrote [pp 37-39 of her draft]:

"Naylor-Foote affirms the most unhesitating cooperation from TF 77 in providing what he asked for. He says: ' ... the cruiser (later corrected to battleship Wisconsin) was enrolled in a shoot under our direction ... I received a message from the main line, from the guerrilla troops, informing me that the evadee was at a specified location. I, therefore, immediately requested permission to use the chopper. I received it and immediately took off. The Captain of the Wisconsin, specifically, and the overall plan was known to the Chief of Staff ... and to the Admiral, Admiral Martin.' ....

"The ultimate simplification of air rescue seems, by this account, to have been reached .... Naylor-Foote says that he was, immediately upon request, given the helicopter, and with it the power of deciding who would ride in it, an air escort, and charge of the routing. On the rider phase, he says that a 'Marine Captain'** volunteered to go along ... as crewman, and that, 'not having another reliable man I could spare from the island, I decided to take this captain' ....

"**AFFE radioed DEPTAR, Washington, DC on 2 October 1953 that 'Lt Col Fuller, USMC, agreed for COMNAVFE to search available material from the Wisconsin for identity (name, rank, SN, and present whereabouts if known) of the Marine Captain and the helicopter pilot on the 4 February 1952 rescue attempt.' The results of this search are not given in the records."

[Author's Notes: 1) Adm Martin, whom Naylor-Foote repeatedly referred to as TF 77 commander was Com 7th Fleet. 2) Any Navy or Marine helicopter pilot of that period would have told them in an instant that a second passenger or "crewman" would not have been carried on a rescue attempt of that sort.]

There are several other indications that Miss Finke was not provided with all pertinent materials when she was directed to do a study of "the Naylor-Foote Case." It is also evident that not all materials made available to her for the study were included among those released to myself. And she apparently found some additional bits on her own. She wrote (p22 of her draft):

"In September 1954, two sergeants at SOD who were involved in some of the technical phases of the Naylor-Foote interrogations of September 1953 were sounded out for their impressions of him. The first: 'It seems to me that all that those interrogators were after was a mess of words. They didn't drive anywhere. I have my own opinion of Naylor-Foote, but never mind that.' The second: 'The way Naylor-Foote acted, he was the kind that thought he was then only one that knew how to do anything. Nobody else knew anything. You know, small moustache, he was very proud of that, and the way he talked. He didn't show me a thing. But a lot of people were all for him' ......"

One of the people among those whom the sergeant thought were "all for" Naylor-Foote may well have been Capt Robinson. After the first two questions relating to the fictitious "first rescue attempt," Robertson wanted to know "the basic facts of the plans worked out the morning of 7 February by Lt Ulatoski and Navy personnel ... with the specific names of all personnel involved."

From the manner in which he asked questions, and also his reactions to my answers, it appeared at that time, from the very outset, that Robertson acted more like a defense attorney for his Army colleague, Naylor-Foote, than as an objective investigator. In retrospect, review of the transcript of his interrogation of myself further indicates the same, especially when viewed in conjunction with the fact that he had previously heard or read a very detailed account from Naylor-Foote regarding all those matters on which he was questioning me. Thus, whenever something I said conflicted with or contradicted what he had previously heard from Naylor-Foote, he was more likely to doubt the words of this Navy "enlisted" man, than that of a fellow Army officer. And every one of the many things Naylor-Foote had said about myself in his lengthy dissertation and subsequent additions, were calculated to promote that attitude in his listeners.

A prime example of the confusion or misunderstanding which might thereby have been generated in Robertson's MA can be imagined in my response to his question to me about the rescue plan which Ulatoski started to outline aboard the Rochester on the day preceding the actual mission. My response, (from the transcript):

"The outlined plan which Ulatoski brought aboard and told me that he had worked up was to make a night pick-up in which case three fires were to be built to guide me in and I was to hover by the center of these three fires and wait until someone brought the sick-man, the pilot, to the helicopter. That was actually all of the outlined plan that I took much look at ... We were so obviously incapable of following such a plan because of helicopter limitations ... At that very point I told him that his plan would have to be just discarded and we should not waste further time ... (with further details of it)..."

Robertson's reception of that statement probably was influenced by several impressions he might have derived from Naylor-Foote's prior statements: 1) He would have known that the plan Ulatoski started to present was actually authored by Naylor-Foote; 2) He might have remembered from the detailed account of the return trip from the "first rescue attempt" that Naylor-Foote had said, "...it was now rapidly growing dark and because of the nature of the helicopter, it being out of adequate instruments to maintain flight without a horizon, nightfall would have completely finished us..." (and a few sentences later) "...nightfall was rapidly approaching to which time the pilot was sure that he would lose control of the helicopter ......"

Now to any logical mind (and there was no indication Robertson's was other than that), since Naylor-Foote was aware during the "first rescue attempt" that a helicopter was not properly instrumented to fly at night, then certainly he would not have sent to the Rochester with Ulatoski a plan for "second attempt" proposing explicitly a night-time pickup. Therefore, it would follow in logical appraisal that this Navy CPO Thorin must have made up the story about the plan Ulatoski started to present calling for a night pick-up. Thorin's motive for doing so, of course, would be, his hostility towards Naylor-Foote, which latter had repeatedly mentioned throughout his report on the mission and the period spent in captivity.

The fact was, of course, that Naylor-Foote did not know of the helicopter's limitations in night flight at the time of the "first rescue attempt" for the simple reason that there was none such rescue attempt. Nor was he aware of that limitation when he worked up a plan for an actual attempt, and sent it to Rochester with Ulatoski. In fact, the very beginning of Ulatoski's presentation of that script was typical Naylor-Foote drama. "Under cover of darkness," Ulatoski had begun, "the helicopter will proceed to this location ...(indicated on a chart)...." His momentum had carried him on with the practiced pitch to the point of hovering over the center one of three fires so the "rescuee" could be brought to the helicopter, before I could stop him. Then after simply pointing out that the machine wasn't equipped for night flight, he was invited to tell me the circumstances of the man and the area, so I could determine if a rescue by helicopter seemed feasible. I didn't even bother to mention at the time (though I certainly thought of it) that the darkness wouldn't be covering me at all while hovering by a fire, but could certainly well cover anyone who wanted to shoot me down.

Well, then, it might be asked, if Naylor-Foote was unaware of the helicopter's night-flying limitations at the time of the actual mission, which resulted in his capture, how would he know to mention it in his report immediately after repatriation? He knew it then because he had learned it from myself at Pak's Palace a few weeks after our capture; during our conversation when his rice-wine-loosened tongue let slip that his colleague from Nan-do, Ulatoski, who came aboard the Rochester wearing captain's bars, was really only a first lieutenant at time.

My response to Robertson's first question to me about planning for the actual rescue attempt may have been especially puzzling, or even unbelievable to him. From the transcript:

"SCR:...Can you give me the basic facts of the plans worked out the morning of 7 February by Lt Ulatoski and Navy personnel aboard the Rochester with the specific names of all personnel involved?

DWT: I cannot give the specific names of all personnel involved. I cannot recall, at present, the name of the Operations Officer of the Rochester other than that he was there — On the morning of the 7th the only persons present for the actual formation of the planning was Mr. Ulatoski and myself.

SCR: I see. Now, will you give me the basic facts of the plans worked out between yourself, Lt Ulatoski and presumably the Operations Officer of the ship?"

Some confusing to Robertson, apparently, was the impression derived from my answer that there were only three people present. After starting to speak to his request for "names of personnel involved," I had shifted in attempt to convey that though there were several others at hand, only Ulatoski and myself were doing "actual formation of the planning," at time. Until decision was made that a helicopter pick-up was feasible and worthy of the risk, there was no other planning to be done. And the only person aboard the Rochester qualified to make that decision was myself.

That fact had been made known to Ulatoski when I was introduced to him by Rochester's skipper, Navy Capt Chillingsworth, on Feb 7, 1952. It was not known by Army Capt Robertson as he interrogated me on Sep 21, 1953. And had I told him so he would probably not have believed it. After rather lengthy explanation to him of information requested from Ulatoski necessary to final decision and completion of planning, he still asked how I received "the details of the basic plan," and what was my "reaction as to their practicability, etc."

Though he pursued that matter no further afterwards, he seemed skeptical of my reply that "the details... were primarily my own planning and decision and I considered myself well qualified in that respect."

Robertson's skepticism may have been due in part to an attitude not uncommon amongst officers of the rear echelons and in the uniformed bureaucracies, that enlisted men generally (if not entirely) lack the intelligence and other qualifications as I seemed to be attributing to myself. In addition to (or apart from) that, he would have known from the "SUMMARY OF INFORMATION OBTAINED FROM LT NAYLOR-FOOTE ... in response to direct pertinent questions" on September 15th and 16th that:

1) "In early April, 52, Thorin accused Naylor-Foote of being responsible for the loss of the chopper and himself .... due to the fact that Naylor-Foote had not kept him fully informed regarding signals to be given from the ground at point of landing .... Naylor-Foote states he had absolutely no knowledge of any such signals."

2) "While at Pyongyang, Naylor-Foote tried to get Thorin to escape with him. Thorin ridiculed Naylor-Foote to his face."

3) "From the time Thorin and Ettinger were brought to Wonsan until present time, Thorin has refused to respond to Naylor-Foote's questions and suggestions, when he and Naylor-Foote were alone together."

4) "Since their repatriation, Thorin's attitude has continued hostile." [Expressed only, by making the charges, since we had not seen each other since long before repatriation.]

5) "Naylor-Foote states that every anecdote or reference he has ever heard Thorin make to officers in the USN, involved adverse criticism of such officers."

6) "Naylor-Foote heard at one time William P Arnold state to Ferranto that Thorin was a 'queer.' This was apparently after Thorin had been returned from the slave camp in Pyongyang and prior to the trip north."

It is of course possible that such statements by Naylor- Foote in response to questions immediately after my formal statement of charges, might have caused Capt Robertson to be skeptical of his Army colleague, Naylor-Foote, as he appeared to be of me during the Sept 21 interrogation. In which case, what he had previously heard from Naylor-Foote about the planning and conduct of our joint rescue attempt must have made the matter nothing short of bewildering.

In his original statement on those matters Naylor-Foote had depicted the mission plan "accepted by the Navy" as having been first "outlined and accepted" by himself and Lt Ulatoski. He depicted myself as "accompanying" the mission. He described himself at dawn of 8 Feb as having "gone aboard the cruiser and was completing the planning phase together with the Captain and Exec officer of the cruiser; the two pilots, both the Ensign and the Chief Petty Officer Thorin who actually accompanied the rescue, who flew the rescue mission - the pilot of the rescuing helicopter."

Further in description of the preliminaries, he added that "...if an accident occurred to the rescuing helicopter ... A very exhaustive and complete alternative plan had been prepared and was thoroughly in my mind prior to take-off. The previous night, I briefed the pilot on the over all general situation .... A clearance of the Navy personnel and Navy craft for involvement in the operation had been obtained from Task Force 77 and of course, from the Captain of the cruiser. I do not know where the authority for the pilot, CPO Thorin, accompanying this mission was obtained nor do I know whether he did so voluntarily or involuntarily. The arrangements had been made prior to my arrival on the cruiser by Lt Ulatoski."

After another couple of pages giving such insignificant details as the types of radio equipment being used, Naylor-Foote recalled: "These arrangements having been completed the inward flight began. Prior to the attempt being made, a special briefing had been given to the

Next came a lengthy description of the "rescue attempt," including a hodgepodge of details, mostly irrelevant or insignificant, many of them inaccurate, and several illusionary. included within that, however, were several remarks which were pertinent to my specific charge that Naylor-Foote had deliberately lied to me about Ettinger's condition. He had told me late the previous night that he had received word from Ulatoski that Ettinger was a "stretcher case," unable or unsure of putting himself in a sling for hoisting. Since we would therefore have to land to effect the rescue, I had decided to take Naylor-Foote along in place of my crewman because of Naylor-Foote's purported (by Ulatoski) great knowledge of surrounding circumstances.

Naylor-Foote first said he had "spotted Ettinger without difficulty by the signal which had been pre-arranged" from "an altitude of about 10,000 feet." Then "as we let down to within a few feet of the ground" he had searched extremely carefully and seen nothing suspicious except that "a wooden building near which Ettinger was standing according to plan was on fire." Shortly he mentioned again that "Ettinger himself was standing according to plan in the center of a triangle laid out on the ground in an improvised panel laid out in triangular form as according to plan."

Next, after describing in considerable detail his plan to jump out of the helicopter without it having to land, "fasten a specially prepared belt around Ettinger's chest, clip it to the helicopter and it would haul Ettinger up without landing," Naylor-Foote "felt then it was quite safe to . . . that a rapid contact could be made with Darby leader." Then yet once again he described Ettinger as "standing I believe, waving a cloth to attract attention to himself."

There followed yet another detailed description of what he was doing and what he intended to do. His intentions included "taking whatever action I felt necessary in regard to the defecting or the individual in the group that we suspected of defecting. I would deal with him in accordance with guerrilla law or bring him back with me to Nando."

At that very point, however, Naylor-Foote's plans were sent awry by the fact that he "saw Ettinger running quite rapidly towards the helicopter." He was "rather surprised to see this" because, as he explained in his statement: "I had not expected that Ettinger would be capable of moving and the plan had been set up on the supposition based on the information he had given to Lt Ulatoski and myself that he was in extremely bad physical condition."

And just in case Capt Robertson or anyone else doubted that was so, Naylor-Foote was questioned on that point just two days after my formal statement of charges was issued. As recorded in the SUMMARY OF INFORMATION previously mentioned:

"At approximately 1430 hours, 15 September 1953, Lt NAYLOR-FOOTE in response to direct pertinent questions ... stated substantially as follows:

"1. Naylor-Foote expected to find Ettinger sick and incapable of moving when he arrived on the mainland."

So much, then, for Navy CPO Thorin's charge that the failure of the mission and resultant loss of personnel and equipment was due primarily, to incorrect information given to him by 1st Lt Naylor-Foote, deliberately falsified and with intent to deceive. A question will ever remain if Naylor-Foote was actually only responding to "direct pertinent questions" on 15 September and subsequently, or if he may have been allowed to read at that time my formal statement of charges.

It is perhaps well to reaffirm at this point that my decision to take Naylor-Foote on the mission, instead of my regular crewman, was not because of anything he had said or done to cause me to feel he was particularly well qualified or capable in helping with the rescue operation, itself. Rather, he was taken along despite some contrary feelings about him in that regard, because of the potential value of the information which Ulatoski had assured me "his man" Naylor-Foote possessed about the area, the "rat line" system, supply caches, safe areas, friendly people and agents, and so on. It was not merely for this one mission that such information was of potential value, nor only to myself. That sort of information, if factually true and correct, would have potential value for any and all Navy and Marine aviators who might find themselves grounded in enemy territory.

Review in retrospect of the transcript of interrogation by Capt Robertson, reveals that I passed up several opportunities to expand on certain points, to his possible enlightenment if in fact that was what he was actually seeking. The failure to do so in the first instance, previously mentioned, was deliberate in the expectation he would himself ask for something further about Naylor-Foote's fictitious "first rescue attempt." The subsequent ones were likely due in part to the then long-ingrained habit in dealing with enemy interrogators, of saying nothing more than seemed necessary to polite response, whether or not a question was actually answered. It would not in this case have been deliberate effort to withhold information, but simply continuation of the practice of limiting response. Also, there did yet remain the expectation that someone in Army be enough disturbed by the performances of Naylor-Foote and Ulatoski to want at least some measure of direct inquiry about the matter.

But no such inquiry was made. In her laborious study of "The Naylor-Foote Case," Miss Finke included in its preface:

"Emphasizing the investigative oddity, against the 800 words from the pilot [meaning Ettinger, the pilot sought to rescue], an estimated 40,000 words were drawn from Lt Naylor-Foote on his part in the same event, in a special interrogation and reinterrogation; . . . more often than not the discrepancies that were brought out in the testimonies were left dangling." Later within the draft study (p 48) she lamented that ". ..neither in Tokyo or the US could the interrogations, or interrogators, find the inconsistencies of the stories and fix on them."

One of the falsities in Naylor-Foote's post-repatriation pitch most needing to be exposed was his contention that Ettinger had let himself be used to lure us into a "trap." it was in fact not at all a trap. Except for the ever-existant risk of mishap, had I gone in with my crewman for hoist pickup as Ettinger was expecting, we would have been in and out of the pickup site at least 15 minutes before the enemy troops arrived in force from the village area two miles or more distant. This would have been the case even if supplies were carried in for the agents, providing that they were dropped out before the pickup.

That would have still been the case even with Naylor-Foote along instead of my crewman, had he thrown out the supplies when ordered to do so. Had that happened, charges would have been made against Ulatoski and Naylor-Foote quite as surely as was done some 19 months later. For I had realized even before lifting off from the cruiser deck that morning that Ulatoski had misrepresented to considerable extent "his man," Naylor-Foote's, qualifications. And I suspected when the additional weight first was added on the helicopter that Naylor-Foote had lied about Ettinger's condition. Ettinger's query soon after if the hoist was broken let me know that for certain.

Although Naylor-Foote had sought to sell me the idea that Ettinger had lured us into a trap as we walked to the village the evening of that day, I really didn't expect him to try still to sell it to others after our return. For he knew full well that it wasn't so, and also that my testimonies would prove it. We a were not shot down, nor even shot at during the attempted landing for the pickup. The three soldiers who arrived, and took us into custody seemed quite surprised at the very sight of us. Probably they spent the night in a house somewhere close at hand. Aroused by the sound of aircraft, and curious about the column of smoke, they had come out to investigate.

The first clue (which I missed at the time) that Naylor-Foote was representing that we had been lured into a trap was a question by Robertson if I had observed anything "that would indicate that the helicopter had been struck by enemy fire prior to the crash."

My response to that was, "No sir. There were no indications of that." Had I realized at the time the question stemmed from Naylor-Foote's false representations, rather than just normal curiosity on the interrogator's part, I might well have added that when a helicopter (such as the one I was flying) takes a hit "you damn' well know it!"

Realization that Naylor-Foote was actually promoting the idea that we had been "trapped," came a few minutes later when Robertson asked (from the transcript):

"R... How were the large group, who were standing behind the three Koreans who actually captured you, dressed and when did you first notice them?"

"T... I noticed no large group behind the three Koreans who captured us."

"R...You did not, at the moment of capture or after the capture see a large group of Koreans any place in the vicinity?"

"T...No sir. I did not."

It was realized shortly after that interrogation session with Robertson that I should have added very emphatically that there were none such there at the time. Nor was any "large group" visible to us throughout the remainder of that day. But in fact the question itself had come as a surprise to me. And my answer had brought a reaction by Robertson vivid enough to be remembered yet today. He seemed to be studying me for a while, with a look which could have been one of "surprise" that I hadn't seen any "large group," or wonderment if I was lying about it. But again, he neglected to further pursue the issue, as he probably should have.

The transcript released thirty some years later, of Naylor-Foote's "Basic Interrogation Narrative," produced in Tokyo between 10 and 17 September, reveals good reason for Robertson's look of wonderment. The following excerpts from nine pages (39-47) of Naylor-Foote's laborious and mostly fictitious account of his actions immediately following the crash, should cause most anyone to wonder. (Most significant falsehoods are highlighted):

"As soon as the motion of the helicopter crashing stopped... I began to untangle myself. My first thought was to contact Darby leader and to begin to effect the alternate escape plan ... I was wearing a Navy-type chute ... It was tying me up. I remember saying to Ettinger ... 'help me out of the damn thing.' The pilot was using his radio, and obviously in contact with the aircap. I heard him say ... to open fire on anything that moved in the area ... Conscious of ... friendly guerrillas ... our best hopes ... told pilot to make a correction ... I said, 'Wait a minute, change that. Tell them to hold off fire. I have friendly guerrillas in this is area.' ... (detailed explanation of his thoughts, etc.) .. The pilot continued speaking on the radio. Realizing that was the most useful position for him to be in, I then climbed out ... ... STILL SPORADIC SMALL ARMS FIRE . . . NONE OF IT SEEMED TO BE DIRECTED AT ME OR AT THE HELICOPTER ... SO I DISMISSED IT ALTHOUGH IT WAS COMING CLOSE, AS BEING DIRECTED AT THE AIRCAP ... I HAD NOT SEEN TROOPS ... EASY FOR THEM TO CONCEAL THEMSELVES. I DID NOT LOCATE THE SOURCE OF THE FIRE. IT SEEMED TO COME FROM JUST ABOUT ALL AROUND US AND I WAS NOT PARTICULARLY PERTURBED OR CONCERNED BY IT BECAUSE IT DID NOT SEEM TO BE DIRECTED AT US, BUT RATHER AT THE AIRCAP AND IF I DID HAVE ANY CONSCIOUS THOUGHT ABOUT IT, I PROBABLY ASSUMED THAT IT WAS JUST INDIVIDUALS IN THE AREA WITHOUT MAKING ANY DEFINITE ANALYSIS OF THE SITUATION - INDIVIDUALS IN THE AREA THAT I HAD OVERLOOKED IN OUR APPROACH WHO WERE FIRING AT THE (planes) ACCOMPANYING US.... (full page more of similar detail) ... Ettinger, from the description he had given me of his physical condition, I considered a liability. Thorin, until I had gotten an estimate of the situation clear in my own mind, I felt was most useful in continuing to use the radio and maintain contact.... (page or more of rambling details of thoughts and actions) ... MY ATTENTION ... ATTRACTED BY THE INCREASE IN VOLUME OF THE SMALL ARMS FIRE. AS YET I HAD HEARD NO AUTOMATIC WEAPONS, BUT INCREASE IN VOLUME AND IN APPARENT DIRECTION. I HAD A FEW ROUNDS WHISTLE PAST MY EAR APPARENTLY FROM MY REAR, WHICH NATURALLY DREW MY ATTENTION IN THAT DIRECTION. I LOOKED AROUND AND MY EYE WAS FIRST CAUGHT BY three NKP soldiers about 30-40 yards TO MY IMMEDIATE REAR who were covering me with burp guns. TO THE REAR OF THEM ... I NOTICED MOVEMENT. I COULDN'T DEFINE ... EXACT NUMBER ... THEY WERE WEARING WHITE SHEETS, THROWN OVER THEIR HEAD AND BACK, MOVING APPARENTLY FROM A FIRE POSITION TO A NEW FIRE POSITION. I WAS SIMPLY AWARE THAT THERE WERE ADDITIONAL INDIVIDUALS BACKING UP THE 3 NKP... ... ...First instinctive reaction was to accept them as the guerillas who I had been expecting to meet. At this time I had my carbine in my right hand at full length trail - the full trail, carried at the point of balance. I had checked the safety, thrown the safety off as I climbed out of the chopper. However, there was a momentary flash of doubt through my mind as to whether I had thrown the safety and I was not absolutely certain as to the identity of those 3 persons facing me ... I could have immediately thrown myself to the ground and opened fire with my automatic carbine. The 3 of them were grouped together and very possibly could have at least gotten off a burst simultaneously with or possibly even prior to their getting off a burst, but the immediate reaction was to accept them as members of my guerrilla group and that is where I basically made my initial error. ... (page of similar detail) ... Had even a single round been fired at that time from the direction of the chopper, while I was covered from the position of the burp-guns facing me, in the direction of the 3 NKP and had attracted the attention of the 3, I would have been able to throw myself to the ground and open fire.... I immediately realized that I was not dealing with friendly guerrillas, but with NKP. However, they were all enlisted men and looked as though they might be slightly bewildered by the situation ... Therefore, without careful analysis of the situation I had to make an immediate decision. I flung the carbine aside indicating by my gesture that I realized the position I was in. ... THE PEOPLE MOVING IN THE BACKGROUND WERE STILL AT SOME DISTANCE. I still assumed that I had friendly guerrillas in the area and I still felt that I had not lost control of the situation. However, in order to get near to the 3 men covering me, I made the decision to throw away my carbine. ... THIS ENTIRE SERIES OF EVENTS THAT I HAVE DESCRIBED OCCURRED IN A MATTER OF 15-20 SECONDS AND THERE WAS NO TIME FOR ANALYSIS THEN. ... Having had previous experience with Asiatics, I first smiled at them which I have found to be generally disarming. ...(another page of similar detail) ... I HAD NOT YET GRASPED THE FACT THAT I HAD WALKED INTO A TRAP. I still felt that I had friendly guerrillas in the area ... ADDITIONAL NI FROM THE PEOPLE TO THE REAR OF THE PEOPLE, 13 NK, FACING ME - ABOUT 100 YARDS TO THE REAR, NOW STOOD UP IN FRONT OF THEIR FIRING POSITIONS. THE FIRING HAD DIED DOWN DURING THE INCIDENT DESCRIBED HAD BY NOW, COMPLETELY CEASED. THE ADDITIONAL NK WERE ADVANCING TOWARD ME ... (more such detail) ... I FELT... THEY MIGHT CONCEIVABLY DEAL WITH THE INDIVIDUALS IN THE CHOPPER IN A DIFFERENT MANNER THAN THE RECEPTION WHICH I HAD RECEIVED. WHAT I WAS ANXIOUS TO DO AT THIS POINT WAS PREVENTING THEM TO OPEN FIRE ON WHAT I ASSUMED A DEFENSELESS ... TWO DEFENSELESS PEOPLE. ... As I left the chopper — there is a point I left out — I did shout back in the direction of the chopper. I shouted, 'Cover me!' ... intended for Ettinger ... It later occurred to me that neither he nor Thorin would have recognized the words I used, the term 'Cover.' I DID NOT MENTION, HOWEVER, DUE TO THE INSISTENCE OF THORIN, THE PILOT, FOR TECHNICAL REASONS; I HAD ABANDONED MY STAND ON THE PRESENCE ... OF ONE OR ANOTHER AMERICAN FROM THE ISLAND WHO I HAD PLANNED TO TAKE ALONG AND RIDE 'SHOTGUN.' ... ... ... I now, facing the N Koreans shouted to the chopper and directly ordered in a loud voice to prevent the ... PEOPLE WHO WERE NOW APPROACHING THE CHOPPER, APPARENTLY INTENDING TO CUT DOWN ON THE TWO OCCUPANTS I shouted out in a mandatory form, in the form of an order for them to surrender, to come out of the chopper without weapons and come toward me. I'd like to make it very clear, I specifically ordered the two, Lt. Ettinger (jg) and CPO Thorin were both subordinate to me in rank and I stated my call to them was in a mandatory voice and would certainly indicate to them in their minds that I was ordering them to turn themselves over. THEY CAME OUT OF THE CHOPPER AND WE WERE IMMEDIATELY SURROUNDED BY QUITE A LARGE NUMBER OF TROOPS."S [ End excerpt from Naylor-Foote narative.]

That, plus much more such detailing of purported actions and thoughts, was the prior report Army Capt Robertson had heard or read in Naylor-Foote's "Basic Interrogation Narrative" which may have caused him to wonder if one or the other of us might be lying to him.

The fact was, of course, that there were none other than the three who captured us in immediate vicinity at the time. There was no gunfire except the far distant short burst as descended to hover over the intended landing spot, and the 3 or 4 burp-gun rounds fired at or as warning over Ettinger, as he tried to scurry out of sight after the crash. The enemy troops who subsequently returned fire at the planes of our CAP did not arrive in our vicinity from their encampments in and around the village until 15 or more minutes later.

Whatever Robertson may have wondered about between my testimony and that of his Army colleague, he pursued the issue no further. His next question was: "What were the exact points discussed by you with either of the other two Americans after your capture and prior to your being moved completely out of the area?"

That question, of course, was a large enough order really to be impossible to fill. After recounting some of the things said and done by the other two I mentioned that Naylor-Foote "did make a low remark to me without Ettinger's hearing it ... to the effect that Ettinger had lured us into a trap. There was no time or opportunity to discuss the matter at that time."

My formal statement of charges, which Robertson had obviously seen, had included on that matter:

"...NAYLOR-FOOTE expressed emphatically the opinion that this had been a trap, although I pointed out that it hardly could have been, since there was no firing at us and our crash and capture was due to other causes. He directly stated that ETTINGER was a traitor and that if he ever got out of this he would certainly bring charges against him...."

It is worthy now of note that Naylor-Foote did get out, but did not bring charges of treason or anything else against Ettinger. He did, however, tell his Army colleagues that it had been a trap. And they, in total disregard of my statement on the matter, and of further testimonies and evidence given or available, accepted his word on it despite the myriad of self-contradictions in his statements on that and other matters. The Lt Col Hagood, Spec Ass't to G2 who directed Miss Finke to do a study of "the Naylor-Foote Case," said that study when partially completed provided basis for conclusion that "A Navy Lieutenant Ettinger lured two other US officers into a trap in hope that he himself might escape captivity."

Miss Finke, in her draft study, also ignored my statement and accepted apparently without question, Naylor-Foote's report that it was a "trap." After reference to Ettinger's statement that the North Korean army officer and interpreter who had actually arranged it had said that, in addition to releasing him from captivity they had wanted to observe a helicopter rescue, she wrote (p57 of draft):

"...The (N Korean) colonel's own alleged release-mindedness and the seemingly more general desire of the North Koreans to see a helicopter rescue could both have been gratified on 8 February; simple non-interference with the rescue attempt and with the helicopter crash if it still had materialized under quiet conditions would have sufficed. But they did interfere with the attempt and they also promptly captured all persons grounded by the crash."

There was in fact no interference at all with the rescue attempt. The short burpgun burst during final stage of descent was far distant and, by its sound, not even in our direction. We were not shot down. We crashed purely and simply because NaylorFoote, who in his original "interrogation narrative" given in Tokyo represented himself as both planner and director of the mission (and myself as merely "the pilot who was to accompany the mission") failed to jettison the supplies which he had insisted on bringing in, and which he had been told in advance must be unloaded prior to landing for the pickup, and which he had been specifically told to jettison during our descent as soon as it was seen that Ettinger was standing, rather than being a "stretcher case," as Naylor-Foote had told me he was.

Had that been done, we would have been in and out of the pickup site, and outbound over the ridge to the south of us, in less time than passed while floundering about before the crash. The three soldiers who took us in custody did not arrive until several minutes after the crash. Those who subsequently battled our covering aircraft, from areas north and east of us, did not arrive there until 15 or 20 minutes later.

After he had been told to do so, there had been plenty of time during the remainder of our descent for the purportedly much-experienced "parachutist, guerrilla-warrior," Naylor-Foote, (whom Ulatoski had urged me to take along instead of my crewman) to jettison that cargo. That he did not do so was most likely because he became immobilized by fright at about the same moment I told him to do so, and did not come out of it until Ettinger tried to push past him into the still hovering helicopter. It was, after all, Naylor-Foote's actual very first time into circumstances where hostile gunfire might be encountered. Ettinger had later described him as appearing to be "transfixed" as Ettinger himself approached the helicopter. It is quite possible that the first, distant burst of gunfire had put him into such a state (as frequently happens to "first-timers" under hostile fire). That short burst was heard very shortly after I had called back telling Naylor-Foote to "dump that stuff out!"

In sum, then, there were no hostile troops within firing range of the site during the brief period of time it would have taken to pick up Ettinger and get out, even with a landing to bring him aboard as was expected to be necessary. It was fully expected that hostile troops would arrive there shortly after, sent to see what the smoke column and air activity was all about. But we would have by then been below the ridge immediately south of the site, flying seaward in the narrow valley which from considerable photo-analysis appeared to have no anti-aircraft installations except where it ended at the shore. The aircraft covering us were some of the same who had kept the enemy in their bunkers two weeks earlier while I picked up one of their shipmates at the seashore north of Wonsan. They would have provided similar service when I would have crossed the shoreline to the safety of the sea.

That was the real plan for picking up Lt Ettinger from the hands of the small group of N. Koreans who had worked up a scheme to thus release him from captivity. And as I told Capt Robertson in Tokyo, I thought it a quite good one. It had, after all, been contrived by one of the most experienced of helicopter "rescuers" of those times; namely, the CPO Thorin whom Naylor-Foote had said he thought someone had "assigned" to "accompany" the mission which he at first insisted he had planned.

Later on, of course, confronted with my charges that (in addition to lying to me about Ettinger's condition) his failure to throw out the cargo when told to was the direct cause of our crash, Naylor-Foote's "paralogical" mind (as Ms Finke had labeled it) could at once insist that at no "time during the formal briefings or informal discussions later (was) any emphasis placed on the amount of cargo carried or the way that cargo would have to be unloaded." (p 138 Finke's study)

"And neither in Tokyo nor the US," wrote Ms Finke on page 48 of her draft study, "could the interrogations, or interrogators, find the inconsistencies of the stories and fix on them."

There was not really any doubt but that the NK colonel and his aide intended that Ettinger would be released. That was evident to anyone knowledgeable in such matters from the circumstances alone. It was evident also in another way. As they bid him "farewell," Ettinger was handed paper money with writing on it, to carry out with him. Ettinger still had that money when he came out 19 months later, and of course delivered it to Naval authorities. Neither Ettinger nor myself were ever asked for even so much as a description of that North Korean colonel or his interpreter-aide. That was not 1ikely because US Naval authorities didn't care to know about them. It could only be because they already knew.

The Army never questioned either of us about them, either. That may have been because they didn't want to know.

All of the foregoing facts (plus many more) were either known or readily available to Army investigators in Tokyo while I was still there. The reader is now as well qualified as this writer to speculate as to why only part of it was sent to Army HQ in Washington for study; why neither Ettinger nor myself were ever further questioned by Army about it; or why no Army investigators in Tokyo or the US "could find the inconsistencies."

Miss Finke, a civilian employee in one of Army's very rear echelon agencies, can readily be forgiven for lack of much insight into detailed realities of military operation in combat areas. She might also be forgiven for the measure of gullibility which apparently allowed her still to believe Naylor-Foote had actually made a previous helicopter rescue attempt, despite the great volume of contrary indications and evidence which she included in her draft study.

But not so some of her uniformed colleagues in that agency; including most especially her "boss," Lt Col Hagood. He, apparently at the time he directed her to do the study, gave her something of a preview of Lt Naylor-Foote's basic character, based on Hagood's prior acquaintance with the fellow. As Miss Finke herself describes it (pp 9 and 10 of the draft):

"...Colonel Hagood was executive officer of the Air Ground Aid Section, G-5, China Theater, from July to September 1945, and commanding officer of AGAS from late September. Naylor-Foote, between July and late October, was serving; under him. Colonel Hagood's story:

"' Upon reporting to Washington in late October 1945, Lt. Naylor-Foote was wearing, along with the Bronze Star (which had been duly awarded to him, (see below)), a Silver Star, and a British decoration, and a Chinese decoration. His two traveling companions from the same unit were similarly adorned. The latter three items Naylor-Foote and his two companions had purchased for themselves. As side interest, they were also wearing French berets, British short-sleeved bush jackets, US Army slacks, and tennis shoes. This was the way they walked into G-2 headquarters Washington, looking the operators from the Orient. All three had received promotions during their last 90 days in China. They had also promoted themselves one more grade. They came in as a major and two captains instead of as a captain and two lieutenants.'...

"This was not, to Colonel Hagood, a surprise revelation of Naylor-Foote's grandstanding bent. He had discovered it before and in somewhat advanced expression in the following cases: 'On 17 or 18 August 1945, on radio instruction from his headquarters, Naylor-Foote walked from his operational position in the Central Louchow Peninsula to Fort Bayard (20 or 30 miles) and took command of Fort Bayard for the allies (not alone—there were five or six others with him—but according to his report alone; this report was not and has not since been contradicted). His mission was to take command, report the status of prisoners held there by the Japanese, take stock of the medical and food requirements to be air-dropped. Naylor-Foote completed his mission and was decorated with the Bronze Star. There remains the fact that this report of Naylor-Foote's had to be returned to him for rewriting twice (by Colonel Hagood, at this time CD of AGAS) because it lacked concrete, specific detail. It lacked organization and was predominantly impressionistic and entirely personal.' Beyond the fact that he definitely set out on this Fort Bayard mission, and more or less definitely accomplished it, Naylor-Foote also demonstrated his boldness by 'parachuting into Louchow Peninsula twice in 1945, once in April or May and the second time in late July or early August.' Colonel Hagood reports this as fact."

[End quote from pp 9-10 of study. Hagood apparently now deceased; according to Army records.]

It was, of course, the same Lt Col Hagood who wrote in sending the draft study back to G2 AFFE\8th Army:

"This study, even as only partially completed, provides basis for certain conclusions which it is believed further investigation will bear out.

a. A Navy lieutenant Ettinger lured two other US officers into a trap in hope that he himself might escape captivity."

The sole "evidence" which Lt Col Hagood had on which to base that conclusion was the testimony of the very same Lt Naylor-Foote whose reports from Fort Bayard he had twice to send back for rewriting, and whom he described as having reported back to Washington in late 1945 as a captain, when he was in fact only recently 1st Lieutenant, adorned with several medals he had purchased for himself and otherwise grossly out of uniform. As for or the "further investigation" which he believed would bear out that and other of his conclusions, there apparently was none.

It in perhaps understandable that Hagood would at the same time discount contradictory, testimony of the Navy helicopter pilot who "accompanied" Naylor-Foote, on the mission. For as Naylor-Foote had several times pointed out in his report of happenings immediately after capture, that Navy helicopter pilot was an "enlisted man."

Actually, Ms Finke did a quite creditable job in her study of "the Naylor-Foote Case," when one considers "what" and sometimes "who" she had to work with. To begin with, she was called upon to study one thing which hadn't actually happened but which, because of the origins of materials and of the "guidance" as she did the study, she had to continue to regard as extant; no matter the absence of any at all concrete evidence to support it, or how much of contrary indication or evidence appeared. She wrote in preface (pp iii and iv)

"For the history and action of the first rescue mission, the evidence gives one man's story to go by, with a brief supplementary report by 1st Lt Joseph R Ulatoski, top officer of Kirkland and Lt Naylor-Foote's chief, not personally around at the time. There is no daily events record, radio record, after-action record, memorandum, or any other kind of a documentary record available for the period to check against .... There are no Navy testimonies at all (or records) for the first rescue mission, even though the mission was in the final analysis a Navy operation and one that seems to have involved some very high-ranking officers."

Earlier in her preface, Ms Finke had noted that, after "the first reading of the case," it was "clear by then that the study was after a hopeless end." After pursuing that end through nearly 20 pages of her 139-page draft she proved the point with regard to Naylor-Foote's illusionary "first rescue attempt" by concluding (p 48): "There is reason to suspect ... that the rescue project was carried out paralogically; that the main basis of it was a quixotic urge that overcame Naylor-Foote at a particular hour to engage there and then in a dramatic event."

Which of course clearly implies that all those Navy people, including high-ranking officers, whom Naylor-Foote had said were involved, must have been equally paralogical, even if not quixotic. It might at the same time cause the study itself to be a little suspect; that the main reason for the study under Lt Col Hagood's guidance, may have been to give one of his underling, civilian employees something to do. ["Makework" projects, after all, are not at all uncommon in governmental bureaucracies, civilian or uniformed.] In which case it might well be said that the end toward which the study was headed was not merely hopeless, but also useless.

Which was probably intentional, so far as some of the people then in Army's G2 section were concerned. Because it would help to give the appearance that something was being sone without really doing anything, with regard to matters about which some elements of the organization preferred that nothing be done.

However, while Ms. Finke's study may not have contributed to solving any of the problems (internal and esternal) which were plaguing Army's G2 at the time, it does now since its release very clearly define a few of them. It is also helpful in exposing the fact that the handling of "the Naylor-Foote case" by investigators in Tokyo and Washington (before it was handed to her a year later for study) was as much of an imbroglio as the case, itself.

After summarizing quite concisely some of the "reasons why" she had decided the study as originally presented to her "was after a hopeless end," she tried to direct it toward a different one. Her conclusion in preface:

"With such evidence, the study was led away from its original purpose of achieving conclusions on the specific actions of the Naylor-Foote case, to the new purpose of examining the case as a saga of its period, whose methods and practices made it possible for it to happen."

It is impossible to tell, from the copy of the study released to myself thirty-some years later, just how much of that "new purpose" Ms. Finke was able to fulfil. For despite the document having been otherwise declassified, eleven of the sixteen pages which comprise its first chapter are completely blacked out. And it appears from the portion of text which is available, that Ms Finke described in those very pages some of the "methods and practices" of selection and assignment which had placed such an untrustworthy officer as Naylor-Foote, together with such an also untrustworthy one as Ulatoski, jointly in charge of a special unit to which myself and my Navy commanders on up the line had reason to believe only men of proven integrity would be assigned. The remaining text does give a clue or two on that; after first a bit in a way of explanation which must be regarded as part of the reason, excuse. First the explanation (pp 1 and 2):

"It was an era of empirical approach for G-2 FEC or GHQ. The Korean war was undulating among unproved fighting principles for indefinite goals; it was a war of unpredictable developments and improbable demands. For G2, the 1951-1952 period was one of experimental building to meet changing purposes. ...(three lines blacked out)... Or, in tune with the peace talks, there were times when the top-level objectives were so vague that nobody knew what was wanted in the undercover line.

"Fluctuating demands were only part of G-2's operating difficulties. The biggest problem was internal. It had hit into the Korea war fresh out of a drastic peacetime erosion. The experienced operators of World War II had scattered out of reach, and no special operations schools had been set up yet to supply trained replacements. As far as, the field phases were concerned, G-2 Far East was still wreckage in 1951-1952. But it had to function and, simultaneously, to reorganize and restaff and all under highly adverse conditions. Following is a brief resume of the setting that was to become the backdrop of the Naylor-Foote case .... (following six pages blacked out) ......"

Such text as was left unblacked in the remainder of Ms. Finke's chapter one, together with Naylor-Foote's own account of it, reveals that the "method and practice" in G-2 which placed him in Task Force Kirkland on Nando Island, was in a sense, very practical though not at all sensibly methodical. In late December, 1951, he was "interviewed" and "briefed" by two light colonels and two majors in two days in Tokyo and Seoul, and immediately on his way to join Ulatoski on the island. Ulatoski left the island just a week or so later for a "conference" in Seoul and some "R and R" in Tokyo. He returned to the island on February 6, just in time to bring Naylor-Foote's "under-cover-of-darkness" helicopter rescue plan to the Rochester on the 7th, pretending it was his own.

Thus, after about 19 pages devoted to the new purpose of examining it as a "saga of its period," the study resumed pursuit of its original "hopeless end."

Let it be clear, the foregoing is in no way intended to belittle or demean the efforts of Ms Finke. It was not because it was unresolvable that she decided study of "the Naylor-Foote" case was "after a hopeless end." That was because some of those who set her to the task didn't really want it resolved. She did an excellent job, for one thing, in drawing out from the limited information available to her, sufficient evidence to convince any objective investigator that Naylor-Foote's "first rescue attempt" did not and could not really have happened. Judging by the tone, of her writings, she realized that full well herself. But she hardly dared state it bluntly. For that would have been to openly dispute one of the several misconceptions and preconceptions which her supervisor, Hagood, had evidently accepted from the beginning and wanted to retain. a) GS-7 in a government agency does not do that to a supervisor of Lt Col rank (or equivalent GS rating) unless she wants to change jobs; especially one with such prestigious title as "Spec Ass't to G2."

This is not to say that Lt Col Hagood did not himself recognize by then the falsity of Naylor-Foote's "first mission" story. But he by then had reason not to publicly admit it. For his conclusions already drawn about the "Naylor-Foote Case," which he said he "believed further investigation will bear out," were all predicated on the assumption that Lt Naylor-Foote's word on the matters must be basically true. No matter that it became necessary for him to acknowledge (in his report back to the Far East G2 on the study) that both Ulatoski and Naylor-Foote were if in a measure "guilty of indiscretion and misrepresentation" and of "discrepancies" in some of their statements and testimonies. In order to accept Naylor-Foote's word that we were "lured" into a trap (over and against my contrary testimony and Naylor-Foote's self-contradictions), it would be necessary to at least pretend to believe the "first mission" story as well.

That would be the case not only with Hagood, but also with those of Army personnel in Tokyo who the sergeant interviewed by Ms Finke must have been referring to when he said in reference to Naylor-Foote: "He didn't show me a thing. But a lot of people were all for him." Most of that "lot of people" (which probably included Capt Robertson) who were "all for" Naylor-Foote when he and they were first confronted with my charges against him, would probably be of the type reluctant to admit they were wrong when further testimony and evidence proved them so. In order to avoid having to do so, they must avoid a clearcut inquiry into the case and, if possible, divert attention away from the most embarrassing aspects of it. Definitely to be avoided any further direct testimony by myself or Lt Ettinger.

The entirety of Hagood's "conclusions" as stated on the "Disposition Form" when the study was sent to G2 Far East on 28 Jan 55 well demonstrates that evasive technique. It reads:

"3. This study, even as only partially completed, provides basis for certain conclusions which it is believed further investigation will bear out.

a. A Navy Lieutenant Ettinger lured two other US officers into a trap in hope that he himself might escape captivity.

b. Army Lieutenants Ulatoski and Naylor-Foote are guilty of indiscretion and misrepresentation of fact in planning the rescue operation and recommending its approval by ranking Navy Officers in the area, and of discrepancies in 1953 statements about the operation.

c. These ranking Navy Officers (and possibly CPO Thorin) were guilty of indiscretion in approving and mounting this operation on the basis of the inadequate and conflicting data supporting the plan.

d. Responsible officers in FEC/LD(K), CCRAK, and FEC/LG were guilty of dereliction of duty in inadequate screening and orientation of new officers, and supervision and inspection of their field activities through requirements for detailed plans and reports and through actual visits to field installations."

Now a self-assigned study by Navy CPO Thorin of Lt Co1 Hagood's conclusions just noted, provides basis for certain observations which it is believed well bear themselves out:

1) Any lingering questions about Naylor-Foote's "first attempt" were avoided by Hagood by simply not mentioning it; this despite the fact that Naylor-Foote spent a great deal of time telling about it in his "basic interrogation narrative," and that Ms. Finke had devoted one of the 8 chapters of the study almost exclusively to that. It would also seem that if "ranking Naval Officers were guilty of indiscretion" (as Hagood concluded) in approving the operation in which CPO Thorin was involved, they deserve also to be chastized for that "first mission" even though only the helicopter was lost (according to Naylor-Foote) on that one, and not its nameless pilot along with it.

2) Hagood's first conclusion then, that Ettinger let himself be used as bait in a "trap," has already been shown as acceptance of Naylor-Foote's word in complete disregard of any other testimony or evidence, and thereafter avoidance of further investigation of the matter.

3) By finding his Army colleagues Ulatoski and Naylor-Foote guilty of "indiscretion and misrepresentation of fact in planning" Hagood achieved several evasions of truth and reality. First, he avoided dealing with my charge that Naylor-Foote had deliberately lied to me about Ettinger's condition just in order to go on the mission in place of my crewman. Secondly, he represents as though those two actually planned the mission, despite inclusion in my statement of charges that the plan brought to the Rochester by Ulatoski, which had been drawn up by Naylor-Foote, was summarily rejected for its impracticality without it being completely outlined. This was also in disregard of my explicit answer to Capt Robertson that details of planning of the helicopter operation were entirely my own, of necessity since I was the only one qualified to do it; and of Naylor-Foote's explicit admission that he knew very little about the mechanics of operation of a helicopter, when he explained why he had not thrown out the supplies we had carried at his insistence, when he was told to do so. Additionally, Hagood's conclusion that Ulatoski and Naylor-Foote were guilty of "discrepancies" in their 1953 statements about the operations, may have been part of his agency's maneuver to avoid the very adverse publicity which would have resulted if they had been formally charged — as they well could have been — with lying, misrepresentation of rank, and perhaps yet other quite serious offenses.

4) Most irritating of Hagood's ill-founded and unfounded conclusions is his contention that the "ranking Naval Officers (and possibly CPO Thorin) were guilty of indiscretion in approving and mounting" the operation which really took place "on the basis of the inadequate and conflicting data supporting the plan."

The ranking Navy Officers did indeed approve the operation; in advance, as it were, contingent upon CPO Thorin's decision that a helicopter pickup of Lt Ettinger was feasible in the circumstances, and worthy of such risks as it might entail. That included, implicitly, their approval of the plan (insofar as an operation of that sort can ever be completely planned). But in doing so they quite correctly, assumed that CPO Thorin, who would be taking the risks would also be final constructor and conductor of the plan and the operation.

The "data" (that is basic information needed) for planning such an operation, was not at all inadequate. It included in fact far more advance knowledge of terrain, and other circumstance than had been available in any of several previous missions this particular helicopter pilot had flown in enemy territory. The operation plan was not based on information provided by the Army's Task Force Kirkland. All they furnished was the information that Navy Lt Ettinger was in the hands of agents in North Korea with whom they were in contact, who wanted to position him in one or another location away from hostile troops, wherefrom he might be picked up and removed by a helicopter.

As for the possibility that it might be a "trap," the actual plan which "CPO Thorin" had devised in coordination with those "ranking Naval Officers" was not in the final analysis or even primarily dependent upon Task Force Kirkland's estimate of their "guerrilla agents'" reliability. My own eyesight was quite good at the time, as was that of every one of the Navy pilots in the aircraft sent from TF 77 to cover the helicopter operation. And all of us, as it happened, were some experienced in looking for the sorts of things we'd need to watch for in this instance. Our keenness of observation in the process of the mission would in any case be the only real assurance that there was no trap. The sight of anything suspicious could turn us back from the mission in time to avoid a trap.

In the actual conduct of the mission, the CAP leader made two low passes over the pickup site, before I even began descent toward it. The blanket of snow over the entire area made his reports to me that he saw no signs of troops in the vicinity all the more assuring. Most reassuring of all, as I began descent, was the appearance of troops starting out from the village 3 or 4 miles downslope. The fact that troops were then being sent out to investigate the smoke column which had appeared at the pickup site was good indication that there were none already there. And with the distance those foot soldiers had to travel upslope, there would be plenty of time to drop down, pick up the man who the CAP leader had clearly seen awaiting, and gone over the adjacent ridge and on the way out to sea long before those hostile troops arrived at the pickup site.

Thus, the helicopter rescue operation which those "ranking Naval Officers" had actually approved was really based on adequate and quite correct information, despite the "indiscretion and misrepresentation of fact" of which Hagood acknowledged Ulatoski and Naylor-Foote were guilty. The only thing really conflicting then with potential success of the operation (other than spontaneous hostile fire which might be encountered on the way out) was Ulatoski's lies to me about Naylor-Foote's quialifications, and Naylor-Foote's lie to me about Ettinger's condition, together with his subsequent incompetence in action.

But having previously accepted Naylor-Foote's word that the arrangement from the mainland turned out to be a trap, Hagood could hardly acknowledge any possibilities to the contrary, even if he recognized them.

5) Hagood's conclusion that "Responsible officers" in three Army units he named were "guilty of dereliction of duty in inadequate screening and orientation of new officers is the singular, uncontestable point in his presentation on the subject. It was officers of those units who so quickly passed Naylor-Foote into position in one of their important field activities from which he could cause so much damage.

Hagood might well have included one more Army unit in that conclusion, however; namely, AGAS, G-5, China Theater. The commanding officer of that unit in October, 1945, had observed 1st Lt Naylor-Foote of his unit masquerading as a Captain and wearing several unearned and unawarded personal decorations; and apparently did nothing about it. Hagood was himself commanding officer of AGAS, G-5 at that time.

Vehemently challenged, however, must be the inclusion as "dereliction" on the part of those other officers, the fact that they had not required "detailed plans" to be submitted for their approval before the rescue attempt was made. It is often the case in combat situation (and it was certainly in this one) that a task can only be done when the opportunity arises. Not all details of such an operation can ever be planned in advance. And by the time a detailed plan was circulated and approved, the opportunity might no longer exist. Plus which, at least in this instance, the officers to whom such detailed plans would have been submitted were probably not one bit better qualified to plan a helicopter rescue operation than were their underlings Ulatoski and Naylor-Foote.

Finally, on that point, the actual plans, for the rescue operation about which the study was made, and about which Hagood drew his "conclusions," were not in the least part those which Naylor-Foote laboriously described in great detail in the lengthy "basic interrogation narrative" which he made in Tokyo after our repatriation. The actual operation, including the planning of it, was entirely Navy. The planning of the helicopter part of the operation was entirely my own. And the only mistakes made in that planning was the trusting by me of two very untrustworthy Army 1st Lieutenant's, and deciding on the basis of their willful and deliberate falsehoods to take one of them, along with me in place of my crewman.

The imbroglio in Army's handling of the "Naylor-Foote Case" stemmed primarily from their acceptance in both Tokyo and Washington of Naylor-Foote's claim that he planned the operation. They therefore accepted also his detailed description of his plan as something worthy of much study. Naylor-Foote also represented himself at first as actually conducting the operation, including detailed account of his instructions to "the pilot" (that is, myself) on the "inward flight" to the intended pickup site. He even provided in that regard a "supplementary report" which contained, along with considerable more of similar illusionary detail, the following exemplary description of his "command" of the operation:

"As we reached 20-30 feet off the ground we began to hover. I shouted 'let down!' Pilot was absorbed perhaps did not hear me. I made a signal moving my hand palm downward through an arc indicating for him to go lower. Pilot nodded. We dropped a few feet and continued to lower very gradually...."

Naylor-Foote's 21 reels of tape-recorded testimony transcribed as his "basic interrogation narrative" is replete with similar descriptions of his "command" of every situation in which he was involved; not only during the failed rescue attempt, but also in the year and a half as a POW afterwards. Reading that transcript thirty-some years later didn't tell a thing about Naylor-Foote which I hadn't well realized long before the two of us returned from captivity. But the fact that some of his Army colleagues in Tokyo could listen to or read such stuff, and still give credence to anything which he said, could not but cause some wonderments about their mentalities and outlooks.

The same was true, of course, of Naylor-Foote's former commanding officer in China Theatre, 1945, Lt Col Hagood. Which makes all the more admirable Ms Finke's ability, under Hagood's "guidance" to perceive and in considerable expose the "paralogical" nature of Naylor-Foote's mind. She might therefore be forgiven for accepting, apparently without question, some notions and attitudes about myself which must have accompanied the other information sent from Tokyo which was eventually handed to her to "study."

One such was with regard to my personal feelings towards Naylor-Foote. Every time there was mention in Ms Finke's draft study of something CPO Thorin said about Naylor-Foote, the reader was reminded that Thorin "disliked" or even "hated" Naylor-Foote, and/or blamed the latter entirely for the helicopter crash.

There was, of course, justification for anyone, to assume that I would have such feelings, if for no other reason than the fact that I did consider him directly responsible for the crash. Lt Decker, after discussion early in our acquaintance of how that happened, had said, "You must really hate that guy ..." with reference to the hardships he had caused me.

"No, lieutenant, I don't hate him," was explicitly the first of my response. Then was added explanation along the following lines: "He's a mental case — he's crazy. You don't hate a mad dog, even if you have to kill it. You even feel sorry for it." To some extent I can say that I feel sorry for Naylor-Foote - but only from a distance. If I were to see him now — especially if he was to say anything to me more than just words of greeting, something about what happened — it's likely I couldn't hold back from punching him out — at least once — for all the times I should have done it, and couldn't because we were in enemy hands ......"

I recounted to Decker then the one outstanding such incident in Wonsan, when Naylor-Foote despoiled our last chance of getting Ettinger and one or perhaps both ourselves out. The interpreter had asked me, with respect to the idea I had given him the night before: "If only one of you can be allowed to go to swim out to one of your ships with Ettinger in the raft, which one should it be?" — Before I could answer, Naylor-Foote had pushed forward to say that in that case it should be himself because he, "being an officer could go directly to Admiral Martin to arrange for their payment." The colonel, on receiving the translation, had turned away with a look of disgust.

"And you still don't hate him?" Decker asked, when I finished the story.

"I did right then," I readily acknowledged. "But I couldn't do anything about it. I didn't even dare say anything. Because if he'd said anything at all to me right then I probably couldn't have held back from hitting him." If it should be called hatred, I went on to explain, that was my feeling for Ulatoski, for his misrepresentations to me about Naylor-Foote; and possibly for whoever in the higher echelons had been so irresponsible as to put two such officers in charge of that Army unit on Nan Do.

Ms Finke was as likely as anyone else to assume that at least part of CPO Thorin's motive in all those matters would be dislike for the fellow whom he blamed for causing all the damage, plus possibly some vengeful feelings. Augmenting such an assumption were repeated insistence that such was the case, by Naylor-Foote, himself. These were contained in the last two thirds of his "basic interrogation narrative." (Which would have been recorded after he had learned of, and possibly even been allowed to read my formal statement of charges against him.) Even more emphatically, he had spoken of my "hostility" when he was questioned directly about some of my charges.

In addition to that, the generally inadequately informed and sometimes misinformed, Ms Finke had in that regard some seemingly conclusive "evidence" from someone completely apart from both the operation and the investigation of it. So therefore was included (p 130) in the draft study:

"Finally, one fact to keep strongly in mind in evaluating Thorin's testimony on any phase of the Naylor-Foote case is that he was personally hostile to Naylor-Foote. He hated him.* He held throughout that Naylor-Foote's blunderings caused the helicopter crash, and nothing else. It was actually Thorin's charges that precipitated the investigation of the Naylor-Foote case. His testimony is neat and disciplined; it reads true, which is a powerful asset if it isn't ...

---

" *One POW campmate of Thorin's and Naylor-Foote's, an Air Force officer named DeArmond, described Thorin as 'bitter about Naylor-Foote' who, he indicated, caused the crash— Said: 'Naylor- Foote was along to drop supplies;' 'was no help;' 'got excited.' Further, according to DeArmond, at the time he was connected with them, 'Naylor-Foote (and Ferranto and Adams-Acton, NF's cellmates) were all considered No 1 criminals by Thorin.'"

That footnote, by its basic character, its origins, and its inclusion as evidence somehow supporting the declaration that "Thorin's testimony on any phase of the Naylor-Foote case" should be regarded at least as suspect and possibly discounted entirely, violates so many principles of fairness, proper investigative procedures and plain common sense as to defy listing in this volume, let alone dealing with them. But exposing just a few things about it should demonstrate the impropriety of it having been considered in the first place.

A phone call to DeArmond (who was then a lieutenant and is now retired from the Air Force with rank of general) elicited from him acknowledgement that he had heard of a Chief Thorin who was somewhere in the Camp 2 Annex prison while he was himself there. But to the best of his recollection, had never met personally. My own recollection coincided. We agreed, therefore that even if we may have met, in passing so to speak, in the period after the armistice just before departure from the camp for the exchange, we certainly had no conversations of substance between us.

Told then that I had a now-declassified document from Army which included something quite profound and somewhat derogatory which he had supposedly said about me, DeArmond insisted that just could not be because since he didn't really know me, he certainly would not have had any reason to say anything about me. As to the possibility it was in response to questions about me, he didn't recall that he'd ever been asked any such. Told what he was quoted as having said, he vaguely recalled having heard something, somewhere about Naylor-Foote and myself having been involved in a helicopter operation. But other than that was sure that if he'd been asked about it by anyone he could only have told them he really knew nothing about it.

Now DeArmond may be correct in his statement that he does not recall having done such thing. But the Army records which Ms Finke cited state very clearly that he did so. Which causes one to believe (whether DeArmond remembers it or not) that he did actually say it. As to why he said it — it could have been because somebody asked. Or it could have been in response to the invitation in the questionnaire used to begin our debriefings, to report just about anything we knew or could think of about any other of the prisoners we knew or had heard of.

Most likely it would have been because somebody asked him. Which then brings up a question as to where and from whom he would have gotten the ideas which he expressed in that statement of record? By their nature, he must have gotten them from Naylor-Foote, himself. Especially so was the line that "Naylor-Foote (and Ferranto and Adams-Acton, NF's cellmates) were all considered No 1 criminals by Thorin." [The "criminals" pitch would be characteristic of Naylor-Foote, no matter that Thorin didn't even know Adams-Acton.]

As to where, when, and how Naylor-Foote may have planted those ideas into DeArmond's subsequently, quite forgetful mind, there are two possibilities:

DeArmond and another prisoner named Zweicher were for several weeks confined in a house next door to the one in which Naylor-Foote, Ferranto and Adams-Acton were kept. Naylor-Foote in his tape-recorded narrative mentions considerable of "clandestine" communication with DeArmond and Zweicher during that time. Which makes that a slight possibility. Yet not too strong a one because Naylor-Foote's recounting of a lot of other things he says he did are really not much more plausible than his description of himself moving his hand "palm downward through an arc" to get that pilot who accompanied him on the mission to put the helicopter down lower.

More likely, if DeArmond got those ideas from Naylor-Foote (rather than just picking it up out of gossip with the "talkers" from the big compound after the armistice) it would have been in the holding camp while waiting out those last days until repatriation. There was time and opportunity for "unclandestine" communication between them, and it was shortly enough before debriefings that DeArmond could remember to repeat it before he forgot it.

Now if the foregoing may not eliminate the possibility that Thorin's primary motive was "hatred" for Naylor-Foote, it should at least ameliorate just a little bit the impact of DeArmond's testimony on the matter. Still to be dealt with, of course, is the question of the general character of that Navy enlisted man's testimony. Its consistency, evidently, was one troublesome thing about it in the study of the Naylor-Foote Case. Ms Finke's summary suggestion that Thorin's testimony should be regarded suspect because it "is neat and disciplined" and "reads true" is perhaps a clue as to why she mentioned in the preface of her draft that "by the end of the first reading of the case" it was clear to her "that the study was after a hopeless end."

It might seem as well at this point for CPO Thorin to rest his arguments in the case on the grounds that if being consistent and sounding truthful are regarded as suspicious, further pursuit of any end is hopeless. However, there is yet one more finding which may wipe out that Navy helicopter pilot's charges and allegations against Army Lt Naylor-Foote. Ms Finke caught Thorin in a terrible lie! (Or at least she thought she did.) Thorin repeatedly denied that he ever heard of Sergeant Terry!

Which, of course, may cause the reader to wonder, "Who the hell is Sergeant Terry?"

Which is exactly the same thing CPO Thorin wondered on the night of September, 1953, when Army Captain Robertson asked him (from the transcript):

"SCR. ... What was the specific discussion in this planning talk of yours with Lt Ulatoski with respect to carrying either a Navy crew man or Sgt. Terry along on this mission?

DWT... There was never a Sgt Terry mentioned in the discussion. The only mention that Ulatoski made was that he had a crewman, that he had a man ready to accompany me. He did not, at that time, mention the man's name in the initial discussion of it, at which time I told him that I had my own crewman who would go on the mission, that they were well qualified in practice in such operations.

SCR... In this discussion, with Lt Ulatoski, did he tell you that a Sgt Terry was to accompany the mission? Or did he simply omit any mention of a Sgt Terry completely?

DWT... He omitted any mention of a Sgt Terry completely. I have not heard of the name until now.

SCR... Was any mention made to you by Lt Ulatoski of taking two persons along with you in addition to yourself on the rescue attempt?

DWT... No sir." [End from transcript.]

The thought did occur at that point to mention the fact that I could not sensibly take two men along, because of the helicopter's load limitations. But there was no evident reason to do so. More interesting at the time was the rather puzzled or skeptical look on Robertson's face. After brief pause, he asked if there were "any changes in the original plan ... mutually agreed upon" by myself and Ulatoski, "between the time of departure of Lt Ulatoski from the Rochester and the arrival of Lt Naylor-Foote?"

That appeared to me to be a complete change of subject from his prior questions about a Sgt Terry. In fact, most of the questioning by Robertson that night seemed somewhat disconnected and rather aimless. The reason for that became clear thirty-some years later. Robertson's questions to me on 21 Sept, 1953, were not based on my formal statement, or questioning about it. They were based on Naylor-Foote's greatly detailed and largely fictitious "Basic Interrogation Narrative!" [Of which, of course, I had no knowledge until it was released to me 30 years later.]

Thus, when Robertson asked if there were any changes in the "original plan" agreed upon by myself and Ulatoski aboard the Rochester, he was not really referring to the plan (insofar as any plan was yet completed) actually agreed upon between the two of us. For he didn't really know about that. He was referring to Naylor-Foote's "original plan," as described in the "Basic Interrogation Narrative," which Ulatoski had brought aboard the Rochester to present. That plan included considerable mention of Sgt Terry. Terry (as Naylor-Foote put it in his "narrative" and Finke would a year later repeat in her "study") "had been deputed to ride shotgun ... This was made impossible by his wound..."

Sgt Terry was mentioned several times by Naylor-Foote, in his "Basic Interrogation Narrative." That was fresh in Robertson's mind as he was questioning me. He must certainly have realized that I had not seen that "narrative." He probably assumed, however, that Ulatoski had mentioned Terry when he presented Naylor-Foote's "original plan" to me aboard the Rochester on the day preceding the actual mission. That was not the case. I had stopped Ulatoski's presentation at its very beginning because of its impracticality. That fact had been mentioned in my formal statement, and even more explicitly in response to one of Robertson's questions. Yet Robertson's reaction when I told him I'd never heard mention of a Sgt Terry, suggested that he not only disbelieved me but perhaps thought I was hiding something by denying that I'd heard of Terry.

Thus did someone called "Sgt Terry" become a very important figure in Army's investigation of my charges against Ulatoski and Naylor-Foote in Tokyo, and Ms Finke's study of "the Naylor-Foote Case" in Washington a year later. It would become to me at one and the same time, the most ridiculous and disgusting, and yet amusing facet of the entire fiasco. Indeed, it might be said the "Sgt Terry Case" in some ways outshone the "Naylor-Foote Case" as illuminator G-2's "operating difficulties," as Ms. Finke called them, during what she termed its "era of empirical approach." (pp 1 and 2 of her study). Combination of the two, in reverse order to their mention above, could well rival the best of Shakespeare as theatrical, tragi-comedy.

To begin with, whether I knew or didn't know, met or hadn't met, remembered or didn't remember or had ever before heard of a Sgt Terry, had absolutely nothing at all to do with my charges or allegations against lieutenants Naylor-Foote and Ulatoski!

Yet I was asked about him several times, by other Army interrogators while in Tokyo. And a Navy investigator asked me about him several months later in San Diego. And every one of them, after hearing my denial that I knew or had even previously heard of a Sgt Terry, looked at me ....as though they thought I should remember him, or as though they were sure that I did and were wondering why I denied it.

It should be to the everlasting shame of G2's investigators in Tokyo that they were unable to solve the great mystery of CPO Thorin's denial that he'd ever heard of a Sgt Terry. Ms Finke in Washington did it quite handily. Not that she was able to determine for certain why Thorin persisted in the denial; but at least proving to her own satisfaction that he had absolutely no excuse for doing so. She included her great expose' on that with her reminder (p 130 of draft study) that Thorin's testimony should always be regarded as some suspect because he "hated" Naylor-Foote, and the warning against being taken in by the neatness and discipline of his testimony. From text of the draft study:

"...it reads true, which is a powerful asset if it isn't. It does not prove that he was deliberately lying— Thorin has his rights to honest slips of memory—but it remains that he did get tripped up one place or the other a while back when he denied that he had ever heard of Terry and then, later declared that it was he himself who piloted the helicopter for the shuttle-trip between Nando and the Rochester on which Terry—with his bullet wound and Naylor-Foote attending—was impressively present. This set of contraries throws some doubt back on Thorin's previous statements denying that the subject of a second-crewman slot for Terry ever came up in the mission planning. By contrast, Naylor-Foote insisted that Terry figured into the plan until "the Navy" cut him out: Terry, himself, seemed to think that it was all set for him to go along if it had not been for his shooting accident."

There is no doubt whatsoever on that last point. That was quite obviously the reason Terry shot himself in the foot -because Naylor-Foote had told him he was going to take him along as "shotgun" on this "second" rescue attempt and Terry didn't want to go. And why would Terry not want to along with his courageous leader, Lt Naylor-Foote on such a grand and glorious venture? Probably because he had heard (perhaps even more than just once) details of all the hazards, trials and tribulations which Naylor-Foote had encountered on his "first" rescue attempt from the Wisconsin, wherein he'd had to settle for a Marine captain (whose name he couldn't remember) to go with him as "shotgun," while a Navy pilot (whose name he also couldn't remember) had gone along with him to fly the helicopter.

Naylor-Foote's recounting of those details, in his post-repatriation "narrative" is much too long for inclusion. A few highlights from it should demonstrate why even Davy Crockett might have shot himself in the foot rather than go along on the "second" one. The following few highlights might suffice.

After bucking a headwind of 60-80 mph to get over the mainland (in a flying machine with normal cruise of 60-70 knots and maximum forward airspeed of 90) via a circuitous route avoiding known flak positions and encountering many unknown ones and a lot of close flak, 6-7 attempts to get down to house where evader was thought to be were unsuccessful because couldn't get through flak and small arms fire. Punctured fuel tank, gas gauge reading empty, barely made it back to ship on edge of darkness, with 74 bullet holes in helicopter making it unfit for further use but no one wounded. Mission a failure, but admiral on had to receive report offers another helicopter for him to try again.

BELIEVE IT OR NOT! That is the essence of Naylor-Foote's oft-repeated story of his "first" rescue attempt. And former Navy CPO Thorin has the formerly "secret" documents to prove it. Details of the story were always subject to revision of refinement with each telling.

Such was the story Sgt Terry would have heard from his "acting" commanding officer, Lt Naylor-Foote, during Ulatoski's absence, before being told that he would be going along on a similar mission planned and conducted the same. So Terry shot himself in the foot.

Such was the story Naylor-Foote's Army colleagues in Tokyo have heard and still some of them be (as the sergeant Finke interviewed said) "all for him." And at least one of those (Robertson) sufficiently so as to aggressively try to inquisition the Navy enlisted pilot who had dared to question the veracity of said "story-teller."

And such was the story GS-7 Ms Finke had read which led her after studying it to "suspect" that the "first" attempt was "conceived and carried out paralogically."

None of them were aware, of course, that the type of helicopter he claimed to have flown in on his "first" attempt, and which he did fly in on an actual attempt, was so limited in load-carrying capability that no pilot qualified in such would carry two men in when going to pick up another. And none of them, (possibly excepting Terry) apparently had sense enough to ask about such a "minor" detail.

Terry, of course, didn't have anyone to ask, until he was loaded into such a helicopter with his self-inflicted foot wound. So he had shot himself in the foot to avoid going on a mission which he could not possibly have gone on anyway. His self-wounded presence in the helicopter with the pilot who would fly that mission, however impressive it was to Ms Finke, was not such as to cause said pilot to make note of or even take notice of his name. And no potential crewman from the island had ever been mentioned by Ulatoski, except "his man" Naylor-Foote, whom he had described as eminently qualified for such a task.

Army investigators in Tokyo did have at least one person close at hand to ask, who was probably as well qualified on the subject as anyone could find. Why none of them bothered to ask him is something only themselves could answer. One of them, Capt Robertson, did ask CPO Thorin if he'd had much prior experience flying that kind of helicopter, but went on to a different subject after learning that he had.

Ms Finke in Washington, under the guidance of Lt Col Hagood, would probably have had to rely on him to obtain such advice. Whether she did so or not is now, a point beyond moot. In any case, for her to contend that failure to remember the name of a self-wounded man whom I evacuated from the island for medica1 reasons cast doubt on denial that he'd ever been mentioned to me as possible "second crewman" for a mission was as "paralogical" as she had said of Naylor-Foote's conception and carrying out of his entirely illusionary "first rescue attempt." Had he been mentioned to me previously in such regard, I would have been the more likely to note and remember Terry's name.

Amusing as it is, the Sergeant Terry portion of the theatrical does not end with the scene of a fellow shooting himself in the foot to get off of a mission he was never really scheduled to go on anyway. "Sergeant" Terry received a "field" promotion to 2nd Lieutenant soon after that. And since several Army officers of G2 took the liberty of speculating some about Navy CPO Thorin, Thorin feels entitled in turn to speculate a bit as to just how that probably came about.

Might Terry have been recommended for that commission by Capt Ulatoski (of course after Ulatoski could legally wear those captain's bars he wore illegally on February 7, 1952)? As commanding officer of Task Force Kirkland, Ulatoski surely needed a replacement for the helpmate he'd lost on February 8.

No matter that, really. The show must go on — or off. And for a guy to get a FIELD COMMISSION as result of shooting himself in the foot, seems like a much better curtain ringer for such a performance as this, than that he only get himself out of a combat mission which he would not have gone along on anyway.

No applause, please! It might bring out an encore!

The Tokyo Disconnection (Part 4)

The Tokyo Disconnection (Part 2)

Table of Contents

©2002, 2003 by Lynn Waterman; used by permission of the author, Duane Thorin.